


Exclusive: CIA IN SPAIN SECRET CABLE
SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT ON AFRICA

Covert Action

INFORMATION BULLETIN



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EDITORIAL

About This Issue

We are pleased with the *Bulletin's* growing acceptance and use by progressive forces around the world. We will continue to expand the depth and scope of our coverage, and thank our friends and subscribers for their support.

This issue contains a number of significant articles. We publish, for the first time in English, the complete text of a secret U.S. Army Military Intelligence cable sent from Rome to Washington, which resulted in its author's immediate expulsion from Italy in February, when it was first exposed there. The document uncovers MI machinations to infiltrate and control the Italian secret services, even as high as Admirals and Generals, and verifies the substance of Supplement B to Army Field Manual 30-31 published in our last issue, despite the Pentagon's vacuous claim that it was a forgery. We also publish a detailed analysis of the CIA Station in Spain, disclosing a very large, active operation engaged in undercover work in that country during this critical period in its history.

And—a first for the *Bulletin*—we are including a special thematic supplement relating to Africa. This section includes a penetrating interview with a black university professor whom the CIA tried, unsuccessfully, to recruit; and an in-depth examination of dishonest academics and foundations used as cover by intelligence networks to track liberation movements. We also present book reviews about CIA operations in Angola, and have devoted the entire Naming Names section to Africa, exposing more than a dozen Chiefs of Station as well as other high-ranking case and telecommunications officers. We will in the future devote other issues to special themes.

Some Criticisms

Because we are dedicated to the defeat of all the CIA stands for, we applaud every effort in this field. We believe that the more accurate exposures of intelligence operations and personnel which appear, the better. However, we regret errors and inaccuracies by anyone engaged in this work because they undermine the credibility of everyone challenging the intelligence agencies. Our cardinal rule has been to err on the side of caution. With the many hundreds of names which have appeared in the original *CounterSpy*, this *Bulletin*, and *Dirty Work: The CIA in Western Europe*, our accuracy in naming CIA officers has never been seriously challenged. (More than 200 names were

deleted from the Appendix to *Dirty Work* because we were not *positive* they were CIA officers.)

Of course, CIA officers are not the only villains. Many outrages are committed by other government officials, including the police and the military, by multinational corporations, and by petty tyrants around the world. But they should be exposed for what they are, and accurately. A reactionary State Department official may be just as insidious as the CIA officer down the hall in the Embassy, but that does not make him or her a CIA employee. Two recent press releases by the present *CounterSpy* have caused us much concern. One is a list of alleged CIA officers in Mexico, published by at least one Mexican newspaper; the other a similar list on Iran, distributed at press conferences and published in a Northamerican magazine. In our judgment, no more than one name on each list might be a CIA employee, and even those are not definite. They may or may not collaborate with the CIA, but they are not *CIA officers*. We have discussed this with *CounterSpy*, and they intend to publish a clarification. In any case, we urge them to be more meticulous in their research and more precise in their language.

Philip Agee

Another aspect of the present confusion requires a response from us. As we noted in our first issue, three of us, including Philip Agee, were associated with the original *CounterSpy* through its last issue in November 1976. Since that time, none of us has been connected with it, and the persons at present with *CounterSpy* were not on the staff then.

A recent UPI dispatch, widely republished here and abroad, quoted a *CounterSpy* spokesman as stating that it and the *CovertAction Information Bulletin* "share a source in common, Philip Agee." Philip Agee is *not* working with *CounterSpy*, he is *not* a "source" for anyone associated with it, and his *only* institutional association is with this *Bulletin*. *CounterSpy* does not verify its suspicions with this *Bulletin*, nor we with it. We ask that our readers, our contacts, and our friends not confuse us.



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Spying on Your Allies:

Another Embarrassment for American Intelligence

by Philip Agee

It was another embarrassment for American intelligence: headlines all over Italy and widely reported throughout the world. On February 13, 1979 the Italian government expelled an American Embassy official for espionage, the first such expulsion in Italy in living memory.

Such drastic action, taken publicly, is almost unprecedented among NATO allies. It raises many intriguing questions, not least of which is whether the US government is systematically spying on its NATO allies. The case also relates directly to the publication a few months ago of a Top Secret US intelligence document. But to understand the Italian expulsion case, we should first go back to this document.

In September 1978 the Madrid magazine *Triunfo* published a "Top Secret" US Army document entitled Supplement B to Army Field Manual 30-31 (Stability Operations). The document was an instruction on how US military intelligence units operating in "friendly" countries should infiltrate the military and security services of the "friendly" government in order to collect secret information which could be used to provoke the host government into taking a desired course of action. The document also described how to infiltrate insurgent and radical groups in order to stage provocations, with violence if necessary, to bring on repression by host governments against communists and other leftists.

During the months that followed the document appeared in publications throughout most of Western Europe, despite US government efforts to suppress it. In Rome, for example, the US Embassy tried unsuccessfully to stop publication by *L'Europeo* by telling its publisher that making the document public would be "inopportune." In the US the document was published in the January 1979 issue of Covert Action Information Bulletin (CAIB).

Publication by CAIB seems to have prompted the wave of denials that followed. In mid-January unidentified "American officials" told reporters that the Top Secret document was part of a world-wide Soviet KGB disinformation campaign designed to damage US relations with its European and Far Eastern allies. The Pentagon said the document was a forgery. And the Intelligence Committee

of the US House of Representatives said it was investigating this and other forgeries designed to discredit American intelligence activities.

Little did the plot-pushers know that at that very moment in Rome the soup was thickening with a concrete example, soon to boil over, of an American military intelligence operation to penetrate the security apparatus of a NATO ally. Dominic Perrone, an Italian-American whose Italian carried a heavy Brooklyn accent, was the central figure.

Working from his Military Liaison Office in the US Embassy, Perrone was gathering sensitive information from six Italian security and intelligence officials on the inner workings, effectiveness and leadership of the Italian government's anti-terrorism campaign. The information he got was highly sensitive because it consisted of the opinions of his Italian counterparts that the anti-terrorism operations were a shambles, indeed practically hopeless.

This definitely was not the kind of information on Soviet military matters that one would expect Perrone to receive in the normal work of a liaison officer exchanging intelligence with a "friendly" NATO service. In fact, Perrone was infiltrating the Italian security services precisely in the manner prescribed in the "forged" Supplement B.


In late January Perrone wrote a 4000-word report to the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency with copies to other US military intelligence units in Italy and West Germany. Among the recipients in Washington were the CIA, the Department of State, and the National Security Agency.

But in Washington secrets are still kept like weather reports. In early February, just a week after Perrone's report hit analysts' desks there, someone in Washington dropped a copy in the mail to the Rome daily *La Repubblica*. On February 13, following translation and efforts to verify its authenticity, *La Repubblica* published it. The same day the Italian government ordered Perrone to leave the country within 24 hours.

The case made headlines the following day in every Italian paper and was carried by the international wire services

and even reported by the BBC world service. But such is the ephemeral nature of crisis reporting that no full analysis of the report appeared outside Italy. Yet many interesting questions arise from a close reading of the report, a photocopy of which was given to CAIB for review and distribution.

First of all, is the report authentic, or could it be another "KGB forgery"? The US Embassy in Rome, the Department of State in Washington, and the Pentagon all as much as admitted that the report is genuine by refusing to deny its authenticity—in fact they refused all comments because they "never comment on intelligence matters." Then too, Perrone himself could have denied that he wrote the report, but he didn't. Moreover, a review of the report by CAIB staff with intelligence experience led to the conclusion that the report is indeed genuine, particularly because of the very recent date of the information (leaving hardly enough time to concoct a forgery) and the considerable data that could be verified independently.



The Perrone report is a scathing criticism of the Italian government's anti-terrorist operations which are described as "totally ineffective", "in violation of the law", "in chaos", and "led by unqualified persons." While this is the consensus of Perrone's Italian military and carabinieri (national police) sources, he leaves no doubt that the Embassy Military Liaison Office agrees.

The report carries a "2" evaluation of its information content which in US intelligence usage means "probably true", while the sources' credibility evaluation is "B", meaning "usually reliable." Moreover, Perrone emphasizes in a special comment the sensitivity of both the information and the sources' positions. This is the reason Perrone attached to the report, in addition to the "Secret" security classification, the NOFORN sensitivity indicator

which excludes the report from the normal intelligence exchange programs between the US and friendly governments such as the NATO allies. NOFORN means "no foreign dissemination", i.e., the report may be seen by US officials only.

The report is divided into two major sections: first, a discussion of the workings of the Italian intelligence and security services, and secondly, descriptions of the personalities and work habits of the three carabinieri generals in charge of anti-terrorist operations.

Perrone's central theme is the failure of Major General Giulio Grassini to set up effectively the new anti-terrorist agency established in late 1977 by the Italian parliament. This organization, the Intelligence and Democratic Security Service (SISDE—Servizio Per Le Informazioni E Per La Sicurezza Democratica) was to have centralized in one agency all the anti-terrorist operations then conducted by the various military and police services.

However, according to a report prepared in December 1978 for Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti by his Executive Committee for Intelligence and Security Services, SISDE at the end of its first year of operations was "not functioning according to the law; had not been carrying out its assigned mission; had not been able to develop a viable structure and was still in the process of organizing; was being led by unqualified persons who ignored the professionally qualified personnel" and "had to be considered almost totally ineffective."

Partly as a result of SISDE's failure and partly as a cause, according to the Perrone report, the Italian Intelligence and Military Security Service (SISMI—Servizio Per Le Informazioni E Per La Sicurezza Militare) was carrying on illegal anti-terrorist operations to the grave detriment of its proper military counter-espionage mission. According to one of Perrone's sources, "SISMI's counterespionage and other missions were now almost non-existent because of a lack of qualified personnel and of the diversion of SISMI resources to anti-terrorism." In other words SISMI was leaving the field open for agents from communist countries assigned to spy against NATO facilities in Italy.

Again on SISDE, one of Perrone's sources observed, "The only agency assigned the anti-terrorist function by law was SISDE which probably was conducting the least amount of actual anti-terrorist activity." Although Perrone's sources admit valid reasons for Major General Grassini's failure, Perrone himself observes that "no optimistic opinions of the present status and future of SISDE was (sic) heard."

But the reason was not only General Grassini's failure. Another carabinieri general, Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa, was crossing from one agency to another imposing requirements and assigning tasks as the Prime Minister's Coordinator for Anti-Terrorism and the Investigation of the Aldo Moro Murder. Major General Dalla Chiesa was also in charge of the special prisons for terrorists.

According to one of Perrone's sources, Dalla Chiesa had the habit of "appearing at raids and other publicity valuable scenes" and "taking credit for what other agencies had done." Another source reported Dalla Chiesa as "action-oriented and interested in obtaining results" without much concern about methods. "The fine points of illegality or legality of this action would not interest him and he would be inclined to take action first and let someone else worry about whether the action was completely legal or not." The same source described Dalla Chiesa as "intelligent" but "not an intellectual", "inclined to be a little ruthless" and "a highly visible person who would also seek public recognition for his efforts . . ."

The third carabinieri general criticized in the Perrone report is Major General Arnaldo Ferrara, former Vice-Commander of the Carabinieri Corps and now the Italian President's Consultant for Anti-Terrorism and Law and Order. Two of Perrone's sources described Ferrara as "very ambitious" and hoping to be the first non-military officer to be appointed Chief of the Carabinieri Corps. One source said Ferrara possibly had accepted the appointment as Presidential Consultant "to keep himself in the limelight and to use the position to obtain future responsible assignments," while another source said Ferrara "probably would use his present position as a stepping stone."

One has to ask the question, on reading such heavy criticism of the Italian security services and their leaders, whether Perrone's sources might be biased through professional jealousies, embittered by failures, or simply incompetent themselves. Perhaps Perrone gave them too much credibility in assigning the "probably true" and "usually reliable" indicators. It could be, except that US intelligence practice reserves assigning "usually reliable" to a source (in this case all six sources have this rating) until the source has been tested over a period of six months to a year. (The rating is on a scale from "A" meaning "always reliable" to "F" meaning "reliability cannot be judged.")



In any case Perrone describes the sources as officers of the military intelligence service (Sismi) and the Carabinieri Corps from junior grade to General or Admiral rank, working in different positions that involve "close contacts

with Major General Grassini and SISDE." The sources also have had close relationships with Dalla Chiesa and Ferrara. It seems they ought to know.

The report reveals that the Military Liaison Office in Rome has used these or other sources for similar reporting in the past and here we come again to the supposedly forged US Army intelligence manual. Perrone notes in his opening summary that the report corresponds to the information requirements of six paragraphs of a directive issued for intelligence collection. Clearly US military intelligence has imposed a continuing requirement for the Embassy's Military Liaison Office to obtain the kind of information contained in Perrone's report. In fact, Perrone also wrote that this report "complements and updates information contained in (three other intelligence reports filed in 1978)."

Is this a classic spy operation with Perrone paying money to his sources and cloaking the operation with all the paraphernalia of clandestine operations? Probably not, although the heading of the report contains a "Project Number" which in the CIA's practice is usually an accounting device for control of funds. More likely, Perrone came to know his sources through normal liaison contact for exchange of intelligence on NATO's adversaries, gradually obtained their confidence, and eventually coaxed them through skillful elicitation into revealing sensitive information on their own services that ought to be kept "in the family."

In any case the CIA's practice throughout the world, and one would expect the military to operate in the same way, is to use "service-to-service" official liaison contacts as an avenue to penetrate the "sister" services. The goal is to protect the CIA's unilateral operations (i.e., activities unknown by the host government or services) from discovery and penetration, to have other services perform services for the CIA, such as telephone tapping, and to monitor the capabilities and morale of the local services. Whether or not the Top Secret US Army intelligence manual is a forgery, the Perrone Report shows that US military intelligence is operating in keeping with the manual's instructions, and without doubt its operations are consistent with the CIA's practices.

Finally, one cannot overlook the question of why this secret report was given to *La Repubblica*. One can imagine Perrone's shock, along with that of others in the US Embassy in Rome, to discover that it took just two weeks for the report to go from his desk in the Embassy to Washington for distribution and then back to Rome for the newspapers.


To answer why the document was leaked, one must ask what result publication will most likely have. No doubt relations between American and Italian services will be strained. In other countries "sister" services of the CIA and US military intelligence services will have still another reason to withhold or reduce liaison and collaboration with the American services. For some five years successive Directors of the CIA have complained of this problem in denouncing leaks and revelations from Congressional investigations.

The Perrone report also had repercussions in Italian politics. Both Communists and Christian Democrats denounced Perrone's activities, and the case surely would aggravate acting Prime Minister Andreotti's difficulties in forming a new government with the Communist Party—which has already begun to agitate for a new investigation into the government's handling of the Moro investigation. Such prejudice to the U.S.'s main political allies in Italy (whom the CIA financed with tens of millions of dollars since World War II) would seem to rule out the possibility that the report was leaked intentionally in order to spur the anti-terrorist campaign to greater effectiveness.

In the end, dissension in Washington may be the most plausible explanation for the leak. The case could only add embarrassment and discredit to the increasingly shaky position of Stansfield Turner, the CIA Director, who in the end must assume responsibility for the Perrone "flap." For he is responsible for *all* American intelligence services, including the military, not just for the CIA.

As in the case of President Carter's recent hand-written criticism of the CIA's intelligence failures in evaluating the Shah's stability in Iran, which was probably leaked by a high CIA official seeking to undermine Turner, the Perrone report would have a similar effect in Washington. Turner seems to have created so much dissension within the American intelligence community that his own people seek ways to embarrass him and force his resignation.

Whatever the truth behind this affair may be, one result is certain. Dominic Perrone, who promised in his report to send a separate report on the internal structure of SISDE,



will file no more reports from Rome. And his Italian sources are unlikely to continue exposing their dirty laundry for their NATO "ally."

SECRET

Department of State

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INCOMING
TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 311549Z

ACTION IIR-10

INFO OCT-01 PM-03, EUR-12 SY-05 MCT-02 /035 W
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FM JCS WASHINGTON DC

INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CG WASHINGTON DC

CSAF WASHINGTON DC

CNO WASHINGTON DC

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SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

NSA WASH DC

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FM USAREUR LIAISON OFFICE, ROME, ITALY

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC/DC-4

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ACSI, DA WASHDC/DAMI-DOA/DAMI-DOH

CINCUSAREUR ODCSI HEIDELBERG, GER//AEGB-C (HO/AEAGB-CH/AEAGB-CI

66TH MIG INS PROV, MUNICH, GER//IAGPE T CI//

CMR, DET D, 66TH MIG, VICENZA ITALY

NAVINSERVA, NAPLES, ITALY

AFOSI DIST 65, AVIANO AB IT//CC

BEN ROME ITALY

USDAO ROME ITALY

AFOSI DET ROME ITALY

S E C R E T NOFORN NO CONTRACT SECTION ONE OF FIVE

SUBJECT: THIS IS IR 2 210 4044 79 (PG2400)

1. (U) COUNTRY: ITALY (IT)

2. (U) REPORT NUMBER: 2 210 4044 79 (PG2400)

3. (U) TITLE: I&SS, STATUS SISDE/SISHI ANTI-TERRORIST ORIENTATION

4. (U) PROJECT NUMBER: 911700

5. (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 790129

6. (U) DATE OF REPORT: 790130

7. (U) DATE & PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 790129, ITALY

8. (U) REFERENCES: G-SCP-49503, IRS 2 210 4156 78; 2 210 4216 78; AID 2 210 4275 78

9. (U) ASSESSMENT: SOURCE B INFORMATION: 2

10. (U) ORIGINATOR: ODCSI, USAREUR LIAISON OFFICE, ROME, ITALY

11. (U) REQUEST EVALUATION: YES

12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: DOMINIC A. PERRONE, USAREUR LIAISON OFFICER.

SECRET

SECRET

13. (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: DOMINIC A. PERRONE, USAREUR LIAISON OFFICER.

14. (U) SOURCES: ODCSI USAREUR LIAISON OFFICE OFFICIAL ITALIAN CONTACT (S)

15. (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC: NO

16. SUMMARY: (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) THIS IR RESPONDS TO PARAGRAPH 12A (1) (B), (C), (E), (F), (G), AND (1)2, 5 OF CIR-G-SCP-49503 AND COMPLEMENTS AND UPDATES INFORMATION CONTAINED IN IRS 2 210 4156 76, 2 210 4216 78 AND 2 210 4275 78 CONCERNING THE STATUS OF SISDE (INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRATIC SECURITY SERVICE) (SERVIZIO PER LE INFORMAZIONI E PER LA SICUREZZA DEMOCRATICA), THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF ANTI-TERRORIST ORIENTATION ON THE COUNTER-ESPIONAGE MISSION OF SISMI (INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE) (SERVIZIO PER LE INFORMAZIONI E PER LA SICUREZZA MILITARE) THE INTER-CTION AMONG THE VARIOUS SERVICES INVOLVED IN ANTI-TERRORISM OPERATIONS, AND THUMBNAIL CHARACTERIZATIONS OF MG GIULIO GRASSINI, DIRECTOR SISDE; MG CARLO ALBERTO DALLA CHIESA, COORDINATOR FOR ANTI-TERRORISM AND THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ALDO MORO MURDER AND IN CHARGE OF THE SPECIAL PRISONS FOR TERRORISTS; AND MG ARNALDO FERRARA, CONSULTANT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC FOR ANTI-TERRORISM AND LAW AND ORDER, THE THREE CARABINIERI GENERALS ASSIGNED TO ANTI-TERRORISM. IT ALSO INDICATES A CONSENSUS OF OPINION AMONG A GROUP OF CONTACTS, ADMITTEDLY FEW IN NUMBER, BUT ASSIGNED TO MULTI-LEVEL POSITIONS WITHIN SISMI AND THE CARABINIERI CORPS IN DIFFERENT LOCATIONS AND FUNCTIONS FROM COMPANY-GRADE TO FLAG RANK AND WHOSE POSITIONS HAVE INVOLVED AND INVOLVE CLOSE CONTACTS WITH MG GRASSINI AND SISDE AND PERMIT THEM TO ASSESS AND AUTHORITATIVELY DISCUSS MG GRASSINI AND THE SISDE POSTURE, THAT MG GRASSINI WAS NOT THE MAN QUALIFIED TO HEAD SISDE AND THAT SISDE WILL NOT FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

22. DETAILS:

1. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) ON 21 JANUARY 1979, A SOURCE WITH THE PLACEMENT TO HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION AT THE EXECUTIVE PLANNING LEVEL AT CESIS (EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES) (COMITATO ESECUTIVO PER I SERVIZI DI INFORMAZIONE E DI SICUREZZA) FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:

A. THE PARLIAMENTARY REPORT ON THE STATUS OF SISDE WAS PAP AND A MISHMASH OF MEANINGLESS WORDS WHICH DID NOT FAITHFULLY PORTRAY THE REAL STATUS OF SISDE AND THE CONDUCT OF ITS ASSIGNED ANTI-TERRORIST MISSION. ON 4 DECEMBER 1978, THE CONSULTANT TO PREFECT WALTER PELOSI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF CESIS, SUBMITTED HIS YEAR-END REVIEW AND STUDY OF BOTH SISMI AND SIDE OPERATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS FOR TRANSMISSION TO PRIME MINISTER GIULIO ANDREOTTI. ALLEGEDLY, THE REPORT, WITH MINOR PUNCTUATION AND WORD CHANGES TO THE HANDWRITTEN FINAL DRAFT, WAS TRANSCRIBED INTO FINAL FORM AND FORWARDED TO PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI. SUMMARIZED FROM THE FULL RENDITION BY SOURCE, THE REPORT CAME TO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSIONS: IT WAS FOUND THAT SISDE HAD NOT BEEN FUNCTIONING ACCORDANT TO THE LAW; HAD NOT BEEN CARRYING OUT ITS ASSIGNED MISSION, HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP A VIABLE STRUCTURE AND WAS STILL IN THE PROCES OF ORGANIZING; WAS BEING LED BY UNQUALIFIED PERSONS WHO IGNORED THE PROFESSIONALLY QUALIFIED PERSONNEL AND; BASED ON ITS ONE YEAR OF OPERATIONS AS BORNE OUT BY APPROXIMATELY 225 SISDE REPORTS FORWARDED TO CESIS, HAD TO BE CONSIDERED ALMOST TOTALLY INEFFECTIVE.

B. PRIME MINISTER ANDREOTTI PROBABLY WOULD HAVE USED THE REPORT TO FURTHER HIS CONCEPT OF A SINGLE SERVICE SINCE SISMI, BASED ON ABOUT 300 REPORTS TO CESIS, IS CENSURED IN THE SAME DEGREE AS SISDE; HOWEVER, IN THE PRESENT POLITICAL SITUATION, IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT THERE WOULD BE ANY ACTION TAKEN WHICH WAS NOT FORCED UPON HIM.

C. SOURCE POINTED OUT THAT THE ENTIRE OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL 14SS STRUCTURE WAS OPERATING IN VIOLATION OF THE REFORM LAW 801 IN THE ANTI-TERRORISM FIELD. SISMI WAS COMMITTED TO ANTI-TERRORISM TO THE DEGREE THAT MUCH OF ITS RESOURCES NOT ONLY WERE INVOLVED IN ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, AGAINST THE LAW; BUT, WERE AT THE BECK AND CALL OF OTHER AGENCIES PARTICULARLY BY MG DALLA CHIESA, SISDE WAS IN GOOD PART SATELLITED ON SISMI WITH THE FEW SISDE PERSONNEL OPERATING IN THE FIELD LOCATED IN SISMI CE CENTERS. THIS EXPENDITURE OF SISMI RESOURCES WAS DIRECTLY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LAWFULLY ASSIGNED MISSION OF SISMI.

(1) UCIGOS (CENTRAL OFFICE FOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS

AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS) (UFFICIO CENTRALE PER LE INVESTIGAZIONI E PER LE OPERAZIONI SPECIALI) WITH ITS COUNTRY-WIDE DIGOS (LOCAL OFFICE FOR GENERAL INVESTIGATIONS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS) (DIREZIONE PER LE INVESTIGAZIONI GENERALI E PER LE OPERAZIONI SPECIALI) ANTI-TERRORIST INVESTIGATIVE COVERAGE AS SET UP BY FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR FRANCESCO COSSIGA INSTEAD OF AS THE JUDICIAL POLICE FOR SISDE AND SISMI WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW AS WAS THE ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATION BY MG DALLA CHIESA WHICH CLAIMED PRECEDENCE OVER ALL OF THE OTHER AGENCIES. THE ONLY AGENCY ASSIGNED THE ANTI-TERRORIST FUNCTION BY LAW WAS SISDE WHICH PROBABLY WAS CONDUCTING THE LEAST AMOUNT OF ACTUAL ANTI-TERRORIST ACTIVITY. THERE WAS A TREMENDOUS DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND WASTE OF PERSONNEL THROUGH THIS PROLIFERATION OF AGENCIES AND LACK OF CLEARCUT CENTRALIZED DIRECTION AND CONTROL.

(2) SOURCE EXCEPTED THE REGULAR CARABINIERI INTELLIGENCE UNITS FROM THE ABOVE GROUPING BECAUSE THEY WERE CONDUCTING NORMAL OPERATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER AGENCIES AND, IF SISDE WERE ACTUALLY OPERATIONAL AND THE UCIGOS/DIGOS STRUCTURE PERFORMING ITS LAWFULLY ASSIGNED JUDICIAL FUNCTION, THERE SHOULD BE NO CONFLICT IN JURISDICTION.

(3) AS IT WAS, THE ANTI-TERRORIST EFFORT WAS IN CHAOS WITH MG DALLA CHIESA LOOMING OVER IT, APPEARING AT RAIDS AND OTHER PUBLICITY VALUABLE SCENES, LEVYING AND TASKING THE OTHER AGENCIES, AND TAKING CREDIT FOR WHAT OTHER AGENCIES HAD DONE. AS A RESULT, THE ANTI-TERRORISM OPERATION WAS HAPHAZARD DESPITE SOME SUCCESS AND WAS OPERATING AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRY. SISMI'S COUNTERESPIONAGE AND OTHER MISSIONS WERE NOW ALMOST NON-EXISTANT BECAUSE OF A LACK OF QUALIFIED PERSONNEL AND OF THE DIVERSION OF SISMI RESOURCES TO ANTI-TERRORISM.

D. ALTHOUGH SOURCE IS AWARE OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES FOR SISDE'S FAILURE TO ORGANIZE AND EFFECTIVELY MOUNT ITS ANTI-TERRORIST MISSION AND STILL BELIEVES THAT SISDE DELIBERATELY HAS NOT BEEN EQUIPPED AND STAFFED ADEQUATELY; SOURCE IS ALSO FIRMLY CONVINCED THAT A MAJOR SHARE OF THE BLAME MUST BE ATTRIBUTED TO MG GRASSINI WHOM HE CONSIDERED TO BE COMPLETELY UNQUALIFIED TO HEAD SISDE. IF MG GRASSINI HAD BEEN QUALIFIED AND HAD EFFECTIVELY ORGANIZED SISDE TO MOUNT OPERATIONS WITHIN ITS CAPABILITIES AND PROVEN THE NEED FOR FURTHER RESOURCES, HE MIGHT HAVE ELIMINATED THE NEED OR EXCUSE FOR INSERTING MG DALLA CHIESA INTO ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND DIVERTED UCIGOS/DIGOS OPERATIONS INTO SUPPORTING SISDE. SOURCE'S CHARACTERIZATION OF MG GRASSINI IS AT PARAGRAPH 2E, BELOW.

2. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) THE FOLLOWING OFFICIAL AND PERSONAL OPINIONS OF MG GIULIO GRASSINI, DIRECTOR SISDE, AND OF THE PRESENT AND FUTURE STATUS OF SISDE ARE BY CONTACTS WITHIN SISMI OR THE CARABINIERI CORPS WHO HAVE HAD PREVIOUS AND PRESENT PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP AND OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH MG GRASSINI WHICH PERMIT THEM TO EVALUATE HIS CHARACTER, WORK HABITS, AND CAPABILITIES AND WHO HAVE HAD OR STILL HAVE OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS WHICH PERMIT THEM TO BE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE SISDE STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES. OTHER THAN FROM MG GRASSINI AND FROM HIS VICE DIRECTOR, VICE PREFECT SILVANO RUSSOMANO, AN EXTREMELY CAPABLE PERSON, NO OPTIMISTIC OPINIONS OF THE PRESENT STATUS AND FUTURE OF SISDE WAS HEARD.

A. FIELD GRADE CARABINIERI OFFICER, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND GROUP COMMANDER: BG GRASSINI IS A VERY FINE PERSON WITH EXCELLENT PERSONAL QUALITIES WHO WORKS EXTREMELY WELL IN AN ORDERED ENVIRONMENT; BUT, HE IS NOT THE INDIVIDUAL WHO CAN CREATE A SISDE FROM NOTHING. IF SISDE WERE A FUNCTIONING ORGANIZATION, FULLY ORGANIZED AND OPERATIONAL, HE WOULD HAVE NO DIFFICULTY IN MANAGING THE ORGANIZATION AND MAINTAINING ITS IMAGE. BUT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE TYPE OF EXPERIENCE AND BACKGROUND NEEDED TO ORGANIZE AND DIRECT SISDE. HE HAS BEEN MIS-ASSIGNED TO SISDE AT THIS TIME.

B. FLAG RANK NAVAL OFFICER, FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO SISMI; BG GRASSINI WAS KNOWN PERSONALLY AND THEY HAD HAD OFFICIAL WORK CONTACT WHEN BG GRASSINI HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE NAVY SIOS (OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND SITUATION SERVICE) (SERVIZIO INFORMAZIONE OPERATIVA E SITUAZIONE). BG GRASSINI HAD PERFORMED EFFICIENTLY WHEN HE HAD BEEN ASSIGNED TO THE NAVAL SIOS; HOWEVER, IT WAS THE TYPE OF ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH HE EXCELLED. IT WAS STRUCTURED ORGANIZATION WITH ORDERED FUNCTIONS AND OPERATIONAL GUIDE LINES WHICH DID NOT REQUIRE IMPROVISION. IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT BG GRASSINI WOULD FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY IN THE UNSTRUCTURED AND AS YET

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UNORGANIZED SISDE WHICH HAD TO BE COMPLETELY ORGANIZED AND GUIDED INTO SUCCESSFUL ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS. BG GRASSINI WAS AN OUTSTANDING FRONT MAN AND WAS CONSIDERED EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE IN A STRUCTURED ORGANIZATION, BUT, IT WAS DOUBTED THAT BG GRASSINI HAD THE NECESSARY QUALIFICATIONS TO ORGANIZE AND GUIDE SISDE. THIS OPINION FURNISHED AFTER THE ASSIGNMENT OF BG GRASSINI TO SISDE WAS AMPLIFIED IN DECEMBER 1978 TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS DOUBTFUL THAT SISDE WOULD BECOME A VIABLE ORGANIZATION AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED AND LED; HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE UNFAIR TO ASSIGN THE BLAME TO BG GRASSINI SINCE THERE WERE MANY POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SISDE AND ITS OPERATIONS WHICH WERE BEYOND ANY POSSIBLE CONTROL BY BG GRASSINI.

C. FIELD GRADE CARABINIERI OFFICER AND Sismi CE CENTER CHIEF: BG GRASSINI HAS BEEN A PERSONAL FRIEND WITH WHOM HE HAS ALSO HAD OFFICIAL WORK CONTACTS. BG GRASSINI SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO SISDE AS THE FIRST COMMANDER TO ESTABLISH AN ANTI-TERRORIST ORGANIZATION FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS. FIRST, HE DOES NOT HAVE THE BASIC INVESTIGATIVE AND FIELD KNOWLEDGE NEEDED TO EXERT OVERALL CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS. HIS EXPERIENCE IN THOSE AREAS HAS BEEN MINIMAL AND EVEN WHEN HE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE NAVY SIOS, IT WAS TO A WELL-REGULATED AND ORDERED STRUCTURE WHICH NEEDED MANAGERIAL GUIDANCE RATHER THAN OPERATIONAL KNOWLEDGE. SECONDLY AND MOST IMPORTANT, HE DOES NOT HAVE THE INITIATIVE, IMAGINATION, OPERATIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND CREATIVITY REQUIRED TO ORGANIZE A SISDE FROM NOTHING. THIRDLY, HE LACKED THE TYPE OF FORCEFULNESS WHICH WAS NEEDED IN AN OPERATION SUCH AS SISDE IN ORDER TO ORGANIZE AND MOVE PERSONNEL INTO THE FIELD AND KEEP THE PRESSURE ON OBTAINING RESULTS. AFTER ONE YEAR, SISDE WAS NOT OPERATIONAL TO ANY MAJOR DEGREE AND HE CONSIDERED SISDE A FAILURE WHICH WOULD NEVER SUCCEED UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS. ALTHOUGH ONE SISDE MEMBER WAS LOCATED WITH HIS CENTER, HE OPENED ALL SISDE CORRESPONDENCE AND WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SISDE AFFAIRS IN HIS AREA. THE FAILURE OF SISDE COULD NOT BE COMPLETELY ATTRIBUTED TO MG GRASSINI. IT WAS DEFINITE THAT HE WAS NOT BEING GIVEN THE GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE REQUIRED TO MAKE SISDE A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION. THE MG DALLA CHIESA OPERATION OVERSHADOWED SISDE COMPLETELY. MG DALLA CHIESA TASKED HIS CE CENTER DIRECTLY FOR ANTI-TERRORIST ASSISTANCE. THE CE CENTER HAD A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE ANTI-TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE AND WAS LEVIED ON OR REQUESTED TO FURNISH INFORMATION BY Sismi HEADQUARTERS, SISDE, MG DALLA CHIESA, TERRITORIAL CARABINIERI, QUESTURA/DIGOS AND HE WOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO BE QUERIED BY ANY OTHER BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT. WITH THE Sismi PERSONNEL RIF, THE CE CENTER WAS DOWN TO THIRTY MEN, AN OVERALL STRENGTH INCLUDING CLERKS, TYPISTS, DRIVERS, GUARDS, WHICH MEANT THAT HE WOULD BE FORTUNATE TO MUSTER FIVE INVESTIGATORS FOR CE OPERATIONS. WITH THE EMPHASIS ON ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND THE REDUCTION IN STRENGTH, THE CE CENTER'S PRIMARY MISSION OF COUNTERESPIONAGE COULD HARDLY BE CONSIDERED TO EXIST. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TIME CONSUMING AND DIFFICULT WORK IN SUCH A SENSITIVE AREA AS TERRORISM, HE DEMONSTRATED A REPORT BEING FORWARDED TO Sismi HEADQUARTERS ON A NEWLY RECRUITED POTENTIAL INFILTRATOR INTO THE TERRORIST STRUCTURE. HE INDICATED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WAS DEDICATED, HAD BEEN ABLE TO INITIATE INFILTRATION, AND WAS CONSIDERED AS BEING IN LINE FOR FORMAL RECRUITMENT INTO THE TERRORIST ACTION CELLS. HOWEVER, HE ALSO INDICATED THAT IN FROM FOUR TO SIX MONTHS IT COULD BE EXPECTED THAT THE INDIVIDUAL WHILE UNDERGOING TESTING BY THE TERRORISTS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE VIOLENT ACTION AGAINST A TERRORIST TARGET WHICH WOULD MAKE HIM GUILTY OF A CRIMINAL FELONY AND BIND HIM TO THE TERRORISTS. AT THAT TIME, HE WOULD PRESENT HIMSELF TO HIS HANDLER AND ASK FOR NECESSARY GUIDANCE AND AUTHORITY TO COMMIT THE FELONY. FACIAL EXPRESSION AND BODY GESTURES WORDLESSLY UNDERLINED THE QUESTION AS TO WHO WOULD AUTHORIZE THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY TO INCLUDE SHOOTING SOMEONE. THE ANSWER WAS NO SAME PERSON WOULD EXPOSE HIMSELF TO CONTRIBUTING TO A FELONY CHARGES OR WORSE AND END UP AT A LATER DATE UNDER A COURT TRIAL WHICH WOULD DESTROY HIS FAMILY AND CAREER.

D. COMPANY GRADE CARABINIERI OFFICER, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER: HAS HAD OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH THE WORKING LEVELS OF SISDE SINCE ITS ESTABLISHMENT AND ALSO HAS A JUNIOR OFFICER'S KNOWLEDGE OF BG GRASSINI WITH A FEW PERSONAL CONTACTS. AFTER

ALMOST ONE YEAR OF EXISTENCE, SISDE SEEMINGLY IS STILL DIS-ORGANIZED AND STILL IN THE PROCESS OF ORGANIZING A STRUCTURE. SISDE IS KNOWN TO HAVE ONE POSSIBLE ASSET WHO, IF SUCCESSFULLY EXPLOITED, CAN BE OF GREAT VALUE. HOWEVER, THERE SEEMS TO BE MORE TALK THAN WORK EFFORT. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF EXTREMELY WELL-QUALIFIED PERSONNEL WHO CAME TO SISDE FROM THE POLICE AGENCIES AND Sismi; HOWEVER, THEY DO NOT SEEM TO BE FULLY UTILIZED. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROPOSED SISDE STRUCTURE THROUGHOUT ITALY HAD NOT BEEN IMPLEMENTED COMPLETELY AND THAT SOME AREAS HAD ONLY ONE OR NO SISDE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED. SISDE WAS NOW TRYING TO ORGANIZE SIX SISDE CENTERS IN ROME AS BASE CENTERS FROM WHICH PERSONNEL WOULD WORK, AS HE UNDERSTOOD, THROUGHOUT ITALY. LOOKING AT SISDE FROM ONE YEAR OF ORGANIZING WHICH HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED, HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC AS TO SISDE'S FUTURE.

E. SOURCE WITH PLACEMENT FOR ACCESS AT CESIS: HAS KNOWN MG GRASSINI ON A PERSONAL AND ON AN OFFICIAL WORK CONTACT BASIS PRIOR TO HIS ASSIGNMENT AS DIRECTOR, SISDE AND HAS OFFICIAL WORK KNOWLEDGE OF THE SISDE ORGANIZATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL STATUS AND OF MG GRASSINI'S PERFORMANCE AS DIRECTOR, SISDE. MG GRASSINI WAS CONSIDERED COMPLETELY INEFFECTIVE AS THE DIRECTOR, SISDE AND LACKED THE QUALITIES REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH AN ENTIRELY NEW ORGANIZATION WITH THE MISSION REQUIREMENTS OF SISDE. THE PRESENT ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF SISDE WHICH WAS STILL INCOMPLETE AFTER ONE YEAR OF EXISTENCE AND ITS INEFFECTIVE OPERATIONAL ENDEAVORS WHICH OPINION WAS BASED ON A REVIEW OF SOME 225 SISDE REPORTS TO THE CESIS BORE OUT HIS CONTENTION. THE FAILURE OF SISDE TO BECOME A VIABLE ORGANIZATION COULD NOT BE COMPLETELY ATTRIBUTED TO MG GRASSINI SINCE HE HAD NOT BEEN GIVEN FULL COOPERATION BY THE GOVERNMENT AND HAD BEEN DENIED PERSONNEL WHEREAS MG DALLA CHIESA HAD GOTTEN THEM. THIS DID NOT MITIGATE AGAINST THE FACT THAT MG GRASSINI WAS NOT QUALIFIED TO HEAD SISDE AND PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A VIABLE SISDE EVEN WITH FULL GOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION.

3. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) AS OF MID-DECEMBER 1978, MG GRASSINI GAVE NO EVIDENCE OF BEING AWARE OF THE UNDER CURRENTS OR THAT HE WAS BEING FAULTED AND CONSIDERED LACKING IN THE QUALITIES REQUIRED BY A DIRECTOR, SISDE. AT A SOCIAL FUNCTION OF 21 DECEMBER 1978, MG GRASSINI ENGAGED A RETIRED FORMER ITALIAN ISS OFFICIAL IN AN ABOUT TEN MINUTE SERIOUS DISCUSSION ON TERRORISM, SISDE AND HIS POSTURE. ALTHOUGH THE DIFFICULTY AND SENSITIVITY OF SISDE FUNCTIONS WAS MENTIONED, THE PROBLEMS WERE BROUGHT OUT AS NORMAL AND INCIDENT TO ANY STRUCTURING OF AN ORGANIZATION. A MAJOR ITEM OF INTEREST OVERHEARD WAS MG GRASSINI'S EXPLANATION OF HIS POSITIVE QUALITIES WHICH CAUSED MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR COSSIGA TO SELECT HIM AS DIRECTOR, SISDE OVER ALL OTHER CARABINIERI GENERALS. MG GRASSINI INDICATED THAT HE WAS THE ONLY CARABINIERI GENERAL WHO HAD THE PAST INVESTIGATIVE/OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE WHICH MINISTER OF INTERIOR COSSIGA CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL FOR THE POSITION. THAT WHEN MINISTER OF INTERIOR COSSIGA DISCUSSED THE APPOINTMENT WITH HIM, HE HAD BROUGHT UP MG GRASSINI'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE NAVY SIOS AS AN OUTSTANDING EXAMPLE OF WHAT HE WAS LOOKING FOR. THEREFORE, HE HAD ACCEPTED THE APPOINTMENT. THE MANNER AND THE TONE OF VOICE IN WHICH THIS EXPLANATION WAS PRESENTED, RATHER THAN THE WORDS, WAS INDICATIVE THAT MG GRASSINI WAS SINCERE AND WAS PRESENTING THE SITUATION AS HE BELIEVED IT TO BE AND WAS TAKING THE OPPORTUNITY TO BOAST AND POLISH HIS IMAGE.

4. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) THE TWO OTHER CARABINIERI CORPS GENERALS WHO HAVE A MAJOR PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS AND WHO MAY BECOME OF FURTHER INTEREST BECAUSE EITHER OR BOTH MIGHT BECOME FUTURE MAJOR FIGURES IN THE ISS STRUCTURE ARE: MG CARLO ALBERTO DALLA CHIESA, APPOINTED AS COORDINATOR FOR ANTI-TERRORISM AND THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ALDO MORO MURDER BY THE RED BRIGADES (BRIGATE ROSSE) (BR), WITH PRIOR ANTI-TERRORIST EXPERIENCE AND RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SPECIAL PRISONS FOR TERRORISTS. MG ARNALDO FERRARA, FORMER VICE COMMANDER, CARABINIERI CORPS, APPOINTED AS CONSULTANT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ITALIAN REPUBLIC FOR ANTI-TERRORISM AND LAW AND ORDER. AVAILABLE CHARACTERIZATIONS ARE:

A. CARABINIERI FIELD GRADE OFFICER WHO HAS BEEN AN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND GROUP COMMANDER AND WHO HAS PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL WORK KNOWLEDGE OF BOTH MG DALLA CHIESA AND MG FERRARA:

(1) MG DALLA CHIESA WAS ACTION-ORIENTED AND INTERESTED

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IN OBTAINING RESULTS AND WAS NOT TOO CONCERNED WITH HOW THE RESULTS WERE OBTAINED. IF HE RECEIVED ORDERS TO ELIMINATE THE BR, HE WOULD START IMMEDIATELY USING EVERYTHING THAT WAS AT HAND AND WORRYING ABOUT INCREASING HIS CAPABILITY AS HE WENT ALONG. THE FINE POINTS OF ILLEGALITY OR LEGALITY OF HIS ACTION WOULD NOT INTEREST HIM AND HE WOULD BE INCLINED TO TAKE ACTION FIRST AND LET SOMEONE ELSE WORRY ABOUT WHETHER THE ACTION WAS COMPLETELY LEGAL OR NOT. HE HAD THE SPECIAL PRISONS FOR THE BR UNDER HIS CONTROL AND IT COULD BE EXPECTED THAT HE WOULD USE WHATEVER MEANS POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN INFORMATION ON THE BR FROM THE PRISONERS. HE HAD WORKED AGAINST THE BR PREVIOUSLY AND HAD GAINED CONSIDERABLE KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THEM AND THEIR METHODS WHICH HE WOULD USE IN COMBATING THEM. MG DALLA CHIESA WAS NOT AN INTELLECTUAL OR INCLINED TOWARDS ACADEMIC REASONING OR LONG-RANGE PRIOR PLANNING; BUT, HE WAS HIGHLY INTELLIGENT WITH THE OUTSTANDING CAPABILITY OF GRASPING SITUATIONS IMMEDIATELY AND IMPROVISING AS HE PROGRESSED IN CONDUCTING AN ACTION. HE WAS A HIGHLY VISIBLE PERSON WHO WOULD ALSO SEEK PUBLIC RECOGNITION FOR HIS EFFORTS FOR A MIXTURE OF PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL REASONS. HE WAS SOMEWHAT INCLINED TO BE A LITTLE RUTHLESS IN HIS APPROACH TO SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHING HIS MISSION AND WOULD USE WHATEVER HE COULD BET HIS HANDS ON WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION.

IN ACTION, HE WAS VERY DIRECT AND WOULD NOT WORRY ABOUT SOMEONE ELSE'S FEELINGS IF IT MEANT GETTING THE JOB DONE. MG DALLA CHIESA WAS AMBITIOUS, BUT, NOT TO THE EXTENT OF MG FERRARA. A RUMOR HAD BEEN CIRCULATING AMONG A VERY FEW INDIVIDUALS THAT MG DALLA CHIESA HAD BEEN PROMISED THE POSITION OF CHIEF OF POLICE AT A LATER, UNDETERMINED DATE. THERE WAS NO LEGAL OR OTHER PROBLEM INVOLVED IN SUCH AN APPOINTMENT SINCE THE PRIME MINISTER COULD GIVE MG DALLA CHIESA THE PROPER STATUS FOR THE APPOINTMENT.

(2) MG FERRA WAS AN INTELLECTUAL, ORGANIZER, PLANNER, AND IMPLEMENTER WHO DOES NOT SIT STILL. A MANY FACETED INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS NOT STRICTLY MILITARY MINDED. HE HAD ARRIVED AT TOO HIGH A RANK TOO SOON. AS THE VICE COMMANDER, CARABINIERI CORPS, HE HAD REACHED THE HIGHEST CARABINIERI CORPS POSITION WHICH A CARABINIERI OFFICER CAN ATTAIN. USUALLY, THE VICE COMMANDER RETIRES. BORN IN 1921, HE WAS TOO YOUNG TO RETIRE SINCE CARABINIERI GENERALS RETIRE AT AGE 64. PROBABLY WAS MADE CONSULTANT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC BECAUSE IT WAS NOT WANTED TO WASTE HIS GREAT TALENTS. A VERY AMBITIOUS MAN, HE PROBABLY WOULD USE HIS PRESENT POSITION AS A STEPPING STONE. POSSIBLE TO BECOME THE FIRST CARABINIERI OFFICER TO BECOME THE COMMANDER OF THE CARABINIERI CORPS OR TO SOME OTHER GOVERNMENTAL POSITION. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MG DALLA CHIESA AND MG FERRARA IS THAT, IF MG FERRARA HAD BEEN GIVEN THE MISSION TO NEUTRALIZE THE BR, HE WOULD HAVE STUDIED THE SITUATION AND DEVELOPED AN ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONAL PLAN AND INFORMED WHOEVER HAD ASSIGNED HIM THE MISSION OF HIS REQUIREMENTS AND THAT HE NEEDED THEM FIRST TO SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETE THE MISSION. WHEN HE HAD OBTAINED WHAT HE NEEDED; HE WOULD MOVE OUT, IMPLEMENT HIS PLANS, AND DESTROY THE BR. AS AN ITEM OF INTEREST, MG FERRARA HAD BEEN AGAINST THE PRESENT I&SS STRUCTURE. HE HAD DEVELOPED HIS OWN PLAN FOR THE I&SS. HIS CONCEPT WAS ONE SERVICE WITH A HEAD-QUARTERS AND TWO FUNCTIONAL OPERATIONAL GROUPS, EACH HEADED BY A CHIEF. THE SERVICE CHIEF WOULD HAVE OVERALL RESPONSIBILITY. ONE OF THE OPERATIONAL GROUPS WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND THE OTHER WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR INTERNAL DOMESTIC SECURITY WITH THE GROUP CHIEFS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DAY BY DAY AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY OF HIS GROUP. HOWEVER, THE SERVICE CHIEF WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR POLICY AND WOULD MAKE FINAL DECISIONS.

B. A FLAG RANK NAVAL OFFICER FORMERLY ASSIGNED TO SISMI: MG FERRARA, WAS KNOWN ON A PERSONAL AND OFFICIAL BASIS FOR A PERIOD OF YEARS. MG FERRARA IS VERY AMBITIOUS AND HOPED TO BECOME THE COMMANDER, CARABINIERI CORPS. HE HAD BEEN THE VICE COMMANDER WHICH IS THE HIGHEST POSITION IN THE CARABINIERI CORPS WHICH A CARABINIERI OFFICER COULD OBTAIN. THE ARMY ALWAYS ASSIGNED AN ARMY GENERAL, THREE STAR FLAG RANK, TO COMMAND THE CARABINIERI CORPS. WHEN MG FERRARA HAD COMPLETED HIS TOUR AS VICE COMMANDER, HE HAD REFUSED SEVERAL OTHER POSSIBLE POSITIONS. WHEN HE HAD BEEN APPOINTED AS CONSULTANT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, HE HAD NOT HELD ANY OFFICIAL POSITION. HE WAS EXTREMELY CAPABLE AND WAS HIGHLY REGARDED BY HIS PEERS. IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT HE HAD ACCEPTED THE POSITION TO KEEP HIMSELF IN THE LIMELIGHT AND TO USE THE

POSITION TO OBTAIN FUTURE RESPONSIBLE ASSIGNMENTS.

5. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) AS A SIDELIGHT TO THE MG DELLA CHIESA CHARACTERIZATION; ON 28 JAN 1979, TWO FIELD GRADE OFFICERS ASSIGNED TO SISMI CONFIRMED, ON AN UNWITTING BASIS, THAT MG DALLA CHIESA HAS THE HABIT OF CUTTING ACROSS COMMAND CHANNELS AND GOING DIRECTLY TO COL P. NOTARNICOLA, CHIEF, FIRST DIVISION, SISMI ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO ANTI-TERRORISM. THE FIRST DIVISION IS THE FORMER DEPARTMENT II (D-OFFICE) RESPONSIBLE FOR ANTI-TERRORISM AND WHICH TRANSFERRED ITS FORMER FIRST SECTION TO SISDE. IT IS AGAIN FULLY INVOLVED WITH ANTI-TERRORISM AND THE SISMI CE CENTERS ARE ASSIGNED TO THE FIRST DIVISION.

6. (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) ON 30 NOVEMBER 1978, THE VICE CHIEF, FIRST DIVISION, SISMI, WHILE DISCUSSING THE PHYSICAL SECURITY AND ESPIONAGE THREAT TO US MILITARY PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS IN ITALY, PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION ON THE EFFECT OF THE ANTI-TERRORIST ORIENTATION ON SISMI'S COUNTERESPIONAGE POSTURE:

A. IN THE RECENT MONTHS, SISMI'S ORIENTATION, PARTICULARLY THAT OF THE FIRST DIVISION, HAD BEEN CHANGED TO AN ALMOST COMPLETE ANTI-TERRORIST STANCE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS, ONCE PRIMARY TO FIRST DIVISION FUNCTIONS, NOW OCCUPIED THE PLACE OF SECONDARY PRIORITY AFTER TERRORISM. THEREFORE, IT WAS NOW DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO SPEAK IN AN AUTHORITATIVE MANNER ABOUT THE COUNTERESPIONAGE SITUATION. IT WAS NOT THAT THERE WAS NOT A CONTINUING AND DEEP INTEREST IN THE COUNTERESPIONAGE AREA, IT WAS JUST THAT SISMI DID NOT HAVE THE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL TO CONCENTRATE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY FOR THOROUGH COUNTERESPIONAGE OPERATIONS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO REPLACE THE QUALIFIED PERSONNEL WHO HAD BEEN LOST IN THE SISMI PERSONNEL RIF AND TRANSFER TO SISDE, EVEN WHEN THEY COULD OBTAIN REPLACEMENTS. THE CARABINIERI CORPS WAS OFFERING FIELD GRADE OFFICERS WITHOUT FIELD INVESTIGATIVE EXPERIENCE. FURTHER, THERE WERE NO ESTABLISHED INTELLIGENCE SCHOOLS AT PRESENT WHICH COULD PROVIDE BASIC AGENT TRAINING TO NEW PERSONNEL AND SISMI WAS DEPENDENT UPON ON-THE-JOB TRAINING. PRESENTLY, TRAINED PERSONNEL WERE ONLY THOSE WITH YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF COUNTERESPIONAGE. UNFORTUNATELY, THESE WERE ALSO THE PERSONNEL WHO WERE MOST EFFECTIVE IN ANTI-TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AND THEIR EFFORTS WERE MAINLY DIRECTED AGAINST TERRORISM.

B. THE FIRST DIVISION STILL HAD A COUNTERESPIONAGE CAPABILITY TO CONDUCT LIMITED FIELD OPERATIONS AGAINST SPECIFIC AND IMPORTANT TARGETS WITH SEASONED AND QUALIFIED AGENTS; HOWEVER, IT NO LONGER COULD PROVIDE THE COUNTRY-WIDE COUNTERESPIONAGE COVERAGE PREVIOUSLY AVAILABLE. EVEN IF RELEASED FROM ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS, IT WOULD REQUIRE THE ASSIGNMENT OF A GREATER NUMBER OF QUALIFIED AGENTS TO THE FIELD BEFORE SISMI COULD REGAIN ITS FORMER COUNTERESPIONAGE POSTURE.

ORIGINATOR'S COMMENTS: (S/NOFORN/NO CONTRACT) STRUCTURE OF SISDE WILL BE REPORTED BY SEPARATE IR. ASSESSMENTS IN PARAGRAPH 2, ABOVE, USE BOTH BG AND MG AS TITLES FOR MG GRASSINI. ELICITATIONS PRIOR TO HIS PROMOTION IN JANUARY 1979 WERE REPORTED ACCORDING TO HIS CORRECT RANK AT THAT TIME. IN JANUARY 1979, THE CONSULTANT TO PREFECT PELOSI, CESIS RESIGNED HIS POSITION IN DISGUST BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT WORK IN CESIS, THAT CESIS WAS INEFFECTIVE IN ASSERTING ANY CONTROL OR GUIDANCE OVER THE I&SS, AND THAT HIS ADVERSE EVALUATIONS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SISDE AND SISMI WERE WASTED SINCE NO CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS TAKEN. PREFECT PELOSI WAS WORRIED THAT THE CONSULTANT MIGHT TAKE HIS ADVERSE EVALUATIONS TO A POLITICAL PARTY TO FORCE ACTION; HOWEVER, THE CONSULTANT FEELS SOMEWHAT APOLITICAL AND HAS NO PRESENT INTENTION OF TAKING ANY ACTION AND ALSO REFUSED PREFECT PELOSI'S REQUESTS TO RETURN TO CESIS. SENSITIVITY OF BOTH THE INFORMATION AND OF THE CONTACTS' POSITIONS IS EMPHASIZED. FEW EVALUATIONS OF REPORTING HAVE BEEN RECEIVED AND PREPARER IS UNABLE TO DETERMINE VALUE OR NEED OF REPORTING. ADDRESSEES ARE REQUESTED TO EVALUATE NEED AND INFORM PREPARER WHETHER TO CONTINUE DISTRIBUTION.

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ROOM 705, U.S. EMBASSY: THE CIA STATION IN MADRID

The United States Embassy in Madrid, located at Serrano 75, houses a large number of American diplomats, assistants, clerical staff, and other State Department functionaries. But, unknown to most Spanish citizens, it also shelters a large group of other Americans who are not what they appear to be, and whose functions are far different from those of the legitimate members of the Diplomatic Corps. All the official publications of both the United States and Spanish governments will list them as State Department employees, with various diplomatic titles, or as military attaches of one kind or another. They are, however, the CIA and NSA contingents, overseeing the "dirty work" in Spain.

Their head is NESTOR D. SANCHEZ, Chief of Station in Spain for the Central Intelligence Agency; his office is in Room 705, U.S. Embassy, and he pretends he is "First Secretary" and "Consul."


How Do We Find Them?

In Spain, as in every other location around the world where the CIA plants its clandestine operatives, the methods of "cover" are fairly typical. "Cover" indicates the various fictions which are created to conceal the real identities of these spies from the local citizenry, many local officials, and, indeed, many U.S. officials. Most of the covers are diplomatic and military, for a number of reasons. For one thing, such cover gives the operatives access to unwitting local politicians, opposition leaders, union officials, civic, church and student leaders, and other potential Spanish agents who might never meet with them if their true role were known. Moreover, diplomatic immunity is often essential in this line of work. Traditionally, when a "diplomat" is uncovered, though perhaps guilty of espionage under the laws of the host country, he or she is usually just asked to leave. And finally, the CIA and NSA operatives must have ready access to the communications facilities which are generally housed in the American Embassy.

Diplomatic and military covers in Spain follow the patterns which CIA-watchers have uncovered over the past several years in many countries. The CIA's requirements of total secrecy and full access to all the administrative support services needed by a large program in a major country dictate that the majority of the Madrid-based personnel will be found in the U.S. Embassy.

How is it possible, then, without being directly involved in the CIA, and without having access to its secrets, that we can analyze the Station in Madrid and uncover these people? It involves neither a magic formula nor wild theories. It involves no access to secret documents. It requires a combination of publicly available data and information which, when properly researched, analyzed and cross-referenced, bearing in mind U.S. economic, political and strategic priorities in a given area, paints a reasonably clear picture of who comprises, and in what numbers, the CIA Station—as well as some idea of what they are up to.

We have analyzed the Diplomatic Lists of the U.S. Embassy, published by the Government of Spain; many years' past issues of the *Foreign Service List* and *Biographic Register*, published by the United States Department of State and giving the official biographies of most State Department employees (for obvious reasons, the *Biographic Register* includes undercover spooks as well as legitimate diplomats); other governmental publications; and the many newspaper and magazine articles which have been written about the CIA, and in particular the CIA in Spain.



The "Leadership"

Prior to August 1976, the Chief of Station in Madrid was ROBERT D. GAHAGEN. (His role was exposed by *Cambio 16* in January 1976.) When Nestor D. Sanchez arrived that month, and Gahagen departed, it appears that DEAN J. ALMY, JR., who had been in Madrid since September 1973, functioned as acting Chief of Station, and Sanchez

served as Deputy Chief of Station. (Almy left Madrid in late 1977 to become Chief of Station in Kingston, Jamaica, a role which was exposed in the *Covert Action Information Bulletin* of July 1978.) At this point Sanchez took over the duties of Chief of Station.

This posting was the culmination of a long career in the Clandestine Services—the elite operations corps of the Central Intelligence Agency. Sanchez was born in 1927, in New Mexico. He joined the U.S. Army at the age of 18, and spent two years in the service. He then studied at New Mexico Military Institute, obtaining his Bachelor's Degree in 1950. He received his Master's Degree at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. a year later. Then, in the tradition of his military training, he rejoined the Army as a First Lieutenant and served overseas for two years. In 1953 he joined the Central Intelligence Agency, where he has been ever since.

Following two years of training at CIA Headquarters in Langley, Virginia, Sanchez assumed his first position abroad as an operations officer when he was posted, in March 1955, to the U.S. Consulate General at Casablanca, Morocco. There, his covers were "Vice-Consul" and "economic officer." After five years in Casablanca, he returned to Headquarters for another five years, undoubtedly including training.

In February 1965 he was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, this time as "Attache" and "political officer." In August 1967 he moved to the Embassy in Guatemala City, where his cover positions of "First Secretary" and "supervisory political officer" indicate that he was probably Chief, or Deputy Chief, of the Station. In July 1972, he was sent for a two-year tour in Bogota, Colombia, this time as "First Secretary," "Consul" and "political officer." That service was followed by another stint back at Langley, after which Sanchez landed in Madrid.

The Case and Operations Officers

We have located at least nine CIA case and operations officers working with Sanchez under the cover of the U.S. Embassy in Madrid. For some we have been able to develop extensive biographies from both the *Biographic Register* and the *Foreign Service List*. (Under pressure from the CIA, the State Department ceased publication of both books several years ago.) For others, we do not have much biographical data. Where we do, however, it is extremely instructive to examine the backgrounds of CIA people to assist in the all-important task of discovering what they may be up to in Spain. It must be understood that the primary objective of these people is to recruit agents; to convince Spaniards and persons of other nationalities living or working in Spain—whether by threats, money, women or wine—to spy for them, to be traitors to their own countries, and, when necessary, to engage in "dirty tricks"—provocation, disruption, disinformation, sabotage—whatever their CIA controls consider necessary to protect "American interests." It is always helpful, when studying the activities of a CIA officer, to know where else he or she has been, and when. A study of events in those countries during those times may help indicate the specialties of the spy in question.

One of the most senior men under Sanchez' domain is DEAN P. HANSON. He was born in 1928, in California; at the age of 18 he joined the U.S. Marine Corps for two years. He then obtained his Bachelor's and Master's Degrees at the University of Oregon and the University of Southern California, respectively, and joined the CIA shortly after his 28th birthday. After five years of training, Hanson first went under diplomatic cover in October 1961, as an "advisor" in the Office of Public Safety (OPS) police training program in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. Although the OPS was ostensibly part of the Agency for International Development (AID)—the foreign aid program of the United States—it was largely under the direct control of the CIA for the fifteen years of its existence, until the U.S. Congress closed it down in 1975 after revelations that it was involved in training in torture and terrorism under the guise of "public safety." Many OPS operatives were, like Hanson, actually CIA, not AID, employees.

Hanson was still a "public safety" man when he moved to Saigon in 1963, working as a "municipal advisor," and appeared as an AID "program analyst" while in Laos from 1964 to 1966. After two years back at Langley, he switched from the Asian field of endeavors to Latin America, going first to the U.S. Consulate in Cochabamba, Bolivia, as a "consular officer," and then, in 1970, to the U.S. Embassy in Quito, Ecuador, as a "political officer." In October 1972 Hanson was transferred back to Langley, and for the period between late 1974 and 1977, we have been unable to ascertain his whereabouts. Then, in July 1977, along with his wife, Ernestine Lupton, he arrived in Madrid, replacing another CIA veteran, FRANCIS S. SHERRY, III.

With Hanson's "public safety" advisory work, and his extensive experience in Indochina and Bolivia, where there were intensive U.S.-sponsored paramilitary and counter-insurgency programs just when he was there, he has some of the best paramilitary credentials of anyone at the Madrid Station. How he is putting this experience to use at the present should be of some interest to the people of Spain.

Another senior case officer in Madrid is THOMAS P. KEOGH, JR., 44. He joined the CIA in 1967 after obtaining an undergraduate degree at Georgetown University, and spending four years in the U.S. Air Force. He also spent some time on an academic fellowship, apparently in Latin America. After an uncharacteristically short training period of less than two years at Headquarters, Keogh was sent out under diplomatic cover in April 1968, as a "political officer" at the U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay. He spent four years there, followed by two years in Mexico City, still as a "political officer." Then, in the fall of 1975 he arrived with his wife, Maria Sierra, in Madrid, officially as part of what is called the Air Force "detachment." Like Hanson, Keogh must be well-versed in "counter-terrorism." As a CIA case officer in Uruguay from 1968 to 1972, he is sure to have been involved in the brutal repression not only of the Tupamaros, but of all the left and center opposition in that blood-bathed country. This was the time of the heaviest crackdown, exemplified by the practices of "AID official" Daniel Mitrione, who, sworn testimony has recently revealed, not only taught torture techniques to the Uruguayan police, but demonstrated the various equipment, provided by U.S. "aid," on live subjects.

JAY K. GRUNER, born in 1935 in Missouri, received his Bachelor's Degree from the University of Southern California in 1957, spent two years in the U.S. Coast Guard, worked one year as a high school teacher, and, in 1960, joined the CIA. During the two years he spent in training, he was supposedly a "public information officer" with the Department of the Air Force. In July 1962 he was sent to the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, as a "political officer," to Lima, Peru, in 1965, and back to Headquarters in 1969. In 1971 he appeared as an "economic-commercial officer" in Bucharest, Romania, and in mid-1974 was transferred back to Langley. We have been unable to trace his assignment between September 1975 and June 1977, but in July 1977 he was sent to Madrid.

Only five days younger than Gruner is JOHN FREDERICK WEBB, born in New Hampshire. After receiving his Bachelor's Degree from Tulane University in 1957 and serving three years in the U.S. Marine Corps, Webb joined the CIA in 1960. His official cover was as an "international investment specialist" with the Department of Commerce—one of the less common cover jobs. He spent seven years in training, and first went out under diplomatic cover in June 1967, posted to the U.S. Embassy in San Jose, Costa Rica, as an "economic-commercial officer." He moved on to Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1970, and then to Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in 1973, this time as a "political officer." He was posted to Madrid in August 1976.

ROBERT K. SIMPSON, at age 38, may be the youngest case officer in Madrid. He received his undergraduate degree in 1962 at Dartmouth College; after spending four years as a Marine Corps Lieutenant overseas, he joined the CIA in 1967. His first assignment under diplomatic cover was in Helsinki, Finland, as a "political officer," posted there in 1971. He remained there until August 1976, when he was transferred to Madrid with the cover position of "economic-commercial officer."

There are four other senior operations or case officers we have been able to locate in Madrid, through various sources, but whose biographies are not known in detail. They are JENARO GARCIA, J. PERRY SMITH, RICHARD G. RAHM, and RICHARD MORENO.

Most CIA Stations have a Deputy Chief of Station, and Madrid must, as a major Station, have one. This person's assigned tasks are varied, including acting as Chief of Station in the Chief's absence, maintaining ongoing day-to-day supervision of all personnel, fulfilling certain operational assignments such as recruitment of local people, and overseeing especially critical or sensitive paramilitary, propaganda or infiltration activities in which the Station may be engaged at the direction of Headquarters. We are not positive who holds this position in Madrid, but a reliable source has indicated that it may be Jenaro Garcia. Whoever it is has his hands full.

Telecommunications

As mentioned above, one of the reasons nearly all CIA Stations around the world are situated within the U.S. Embassy in the capital city is because of the safety it provides the Agency's communications network. Although the

State Department has its own communications and records systems in each location, the CIA maintains a totally separate system of communications, and has its own personnel running the system. This is because the CIA has never been willing to entrust any of its telecommunication functions to its State Department hosts, even though the State Department often uses the CIA's separate channels for the transmission of its "Top Secret" cables and messages, sometimes marked "Eyes Only for The President." These CIA telecommunications personnel are highly trained and skilled in cryptology.

Three CIA telecommunications people now assigned to Madrid are: the Chief of the section, CHARLES M. MURPHY (whose previous assignments included Tripoli, Managua and New Delhi, before his arrival in Spain in late 1975), MARTIN I. JOHNSEN (who arrived in the fall of 1977), and ROGER L. LOVERIDGE (who arrived in the summer of 1978).

Secretarial and Records Keeping

The other key element in Madrid, as in every CIA Station, is the secretarial and records keeping group. Like each government bureaucracy, the CIA generates a vast amount of paperwork, including memoranda, field information reports, monthly reports, reports on surveillance and observation of individuals and foreign embassies, financial reports, reports on travel control, postal intercepts and listening-post programs, operational reports on recruitment efforts, and requests for name checks by CIA Headquarters, to say nothing of the continual stream of administrative cable traffic both to and from CIA Headquarters. In essence, without the secretarial/records personnel and the telecommunications officers, the CIA's entire program at a Station would grind to a halt. CIA operations officers in the field (almost universally men) depend upon their secretarial staff (usually women) like fish depend upon water.

GAIL D. McLEAN was the private secretary of former Chief of Station Robert D. Gahagen. When he left, she was joined by GERALDINE M. PILLAR to handle the needs of Dean J. Almy, Jr. and Nestor Sanchez. JULIET DORLAND was Almy's secretary until Pillar arrived, and then served as secretary to RICHARD D. HARRINGTON, a case officer who departed from Madrid in 1977. Dorland then took over the secretarial needs of Jenaro Garcia, the apparent Deputy Chief of Station. PAULINE ALBRIGHT came to Madrid in 1976, and at present is part of the secretarial pool which services operations officers Rahm, Webb, Gruner, Keogh, Moreno, Hanson and Smith. They are helped by RUTH K. RADER and Geraldine Pillar, though Rader and Pillar give much of their working time to Chief of Station Sanchez.

Military and Other Covers

As if these people were not enough, there are still more. It is standard procedure for the CIA to utilize military bases for the cover of Agency operatives. Although no names are known at this time, it is believed certain that

Torrejon Air Base and Rota Naval Station, as well, possibly, as Moron Base in Seville and Zaragoza Base, serve as cover locations for Agency personnel and operations. The U.S. consular offices in Barcelona, Bilbao, Seville, Malaga, Las Palmas, Valencia and Palma de Mallorca also serve, at times, as cover for CIA personnel. Some have in the past, and they undoubtedly will in the future.

There is as well the Joint U.S. Military Group/Military Advisory and Assistance Group (JUSMG/MAAG), comprised of military personnel with ranks from Master Sergeant to Major General and a number of civilians. While there are some bona fide civilian-employees in such military advisory groups around the world fulfilling ordinary administrative tasks, most such civilians turn out to be CIA officers under military cover. There are at least six such persons in Spain at present. No trace of them could be found in State Department biographical records over the last thirty years, so it is not possible to be absolutely positive, but the strong likelihood is clear. These men are: ANTHONY BISSELL, GEORGE H. CANALE (in Jerez, Cadiz), JESUS LEYVA, WILLIAM R. LIDDINGTON, FRANK M. PATETE and CARL F. WOOD (in Puerto de Santa Maria).

The National Security Agency

Like the CIA, the National Security Agency (NSA) requires cover for its personnel based in American embassies. The super-secret NSA is responsible for the United States Government's vast network of electronic surveillance—especially microwave interception—around the world. NSA has the potential to overhear virtually every electronic communication transmitted anywhere. The NSA is also known to have ongoing programs of monitoring the most secret or intimate discussions that are taking place, in the Cabinet rooms or even in the office and private living quarters of the head of state. And, in addition to its major bases—its headquarters for Western Europe are in the United Kingdom—it too stations personnel at American embassies.

It is a known fact, even acknowledged by the Pentagon, that some, if not most, military attaches are members of the huge Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); but civilians are another matter. At least since 1976 there have been a significant number of civilians who supposedly are part of the Defense Attache Office (DAO) at the Madrid Embassy. At

present, there are ten such civilians. As with the six MAAG personnel named above, their biographies are nowhere to be found, indicating they are not in any case normal diplomats. It is unusual that they are all civilians in what is traditionally the exclusive territory of the military. The ten of them, all Americans, all male, are all known to occupy the same office. What office? Room 704. This proximity to Nestor Sanchez' office, Room 705, leads to the logical conclusion that the ten gentlemen are either CIA or NSA personnel. They are: DAVID BOOTH, CLARENCE M. BURNS, HARVEY GRIFFIN, ARTHUR KENNEDY, HAROLD KULP, RICHARD J. REITER, JAMES RUSS, GERALD C. SANDERS, MARSHALL C. SMALLWOOD and PETER STINUS.


Caveat

We must note that our research is based on available data over the last several years, combined with information from reliable sources in Madrid. To the best of our knowledge, the people named in this article are at this very moment stationed in Spain. It is not impossible, however, that one or more of them have in recent months been transferred. Their replacements are not yet known to us. It is for the people of Spain to observe these operatives and see who remains and who has been replaced.

Conclusion

From the size of the CIA Station in Spain, and from the seniority and experience of the personnel, there is no doubt that Madrid is a key priority for the CIA in this post-Franco period. It is not our intention or desire to comment on internal Spanish politics. Indeed, it is the driving principle of our total opposition to the CIA that we believe the people of any country must determine their own destiny in accordance with their own wishes. The *raison d'etre* for the CIA is just the opposite—to manipulate, corrupt, subvert and sabotage the internal structures of other countries to the supposed wishes of "American interests." We believe that the people of Spain will determine what is best for the people of Spain—not Nestor D. Sanchez & Company.

NOTE: This article, by the Washington staff of the CovertAction Information Bulletin, first appeared in the March 19, 1979 and March 26, 1979, issues of La Calle, in Madrid, Spain.



CIA Recruitment for Africa:

The Case of Howard University, Washington, D.C.

Kemba Maish, 33, is a professor of psychology at Howard University in Washington, D.C., the preeminent black university in the United States. She teaches clinical and community psychology. She is a member of the Association of Black Psychologists, and has been very active in black organizations since the 60s. Her doctoral dissertation was on Black Power and Pan-Africanism.

Imagine her surprise, then, some months ago, when she returned a phone message she had received at Howard and heard the operator answer, "Personnel, CIA."

This was the beginning of uncovering a pervasive and sinister CIA recruitment program for Africa, aimed at black professionals at Howard and elsewhere. Kemba Maish debated whether to say anything to anyone; simply being contacted by the CIA can raise questions with friends and colleagues. But she realized that not speaking out would be falling into the CIA's trap. It was more important that the community be aware of what the CIA was doing. She taped an interview with WHUR, the Howard University radio station. The night her interview was to air, between the 5:15 news summary and the 6:00 news program, the tape of the interview disappeared.

The CovertAction Information Bulletin contacted Ms. Maish, and she agreed to tell, once more, her story—alerting black students, teachers and professionals to this menace threatening the black community in America and, ultimately, African people wherever they are in the world. The interview was conducted recently by the Washington staff of the Bulletin. The text follows:

CAIB: Tell us what happened, how you first had contact with the CIA, and when you realized what was happening.



KM: Approximately April of last year—I had been at Howard almost a semester at that time—I received a call from someone named Roy Savoy. I was out at the time and he had left several messages.

CAIB: Did you know the name, or who he was?

KM: I had never heard of him. Naturally, I tried to get back to him. The first time I called, the person who answered said, "Personnel, CIA." I was very curious as to why Personnel, CIA, was trying to get in touch with me. When I finally talked with him, of course I was still upset, but I decided to sit back and relax and hear what he had to say. I wanted to hear his whole program. He said that he was black, which was very clear from our conversation, and

that he was the director of some section of the CIA which was recruiting black people, specifically black psychologists, to go to Africa and develop profiles on foreign nationals. I asked him what he meant by foreign nationals, did he mean develop profiles on African people. He said no, that I would just be developing profiles on communists that were in Africa so I wouldn't have to worry about spying on my own people. He went on to talk about paying me a fantastic salary, paying my way to Africa, all kinds of very enticing programs.

CAIB: Did he talk about under what guise you would do this, what you would say you were doing, your cover?

KM: No, not at that point?

CAIB: Did he mention sums when he talked about money?

KM: No, he really didn't, but he implied that it was much more than I would be getting at Howard. That would be something we could negotiate, the salary. Then he went on to tell me how he got my name, without my asking. I was wondering, but I was going to wait. He said he had gotten my name from the University of Maryland, that first he had gone to the director of one of the black programs at Maryland.

CAIB: Did you know who that was?

KM: Yes, somebody who was outspoken on the Maryland campus and generally concerned about black people.

CAIB: Did Savoy say that he had obtained your name from him?

KM: No, this was just the first step. He got the names of professors in the psychology department from that director.

CAIB: Could you tell from the way that Savoy explained it whether the director knew that he was giving names of professors to the CIA?

KM: Yes, I got the impression that he knew. Savoy told me that he had received the names of professors from him, but that Oscar Barbarin in the psychology department gave him my name.

CAIB: Had he been a professor of yours?

KM: Yes, I had worked with him very closely; he was on my thesis and dissertation committees. Both my Master's thesis and my dissertation involved looking at the relationship between political activism, political orientation, and positive mental health in black people. Barbarin had worked with me for two or three years, so he knew my interest in issues related to the liberation struggles of all African people.

CAIB: So Barbarin knew that you were not a conservative?

KM: Oh yes, he knew everything about me and my polit-

ical activities. After Savoy told me that Barbarin had given him my name, I was still sitting back, not saying anything. When he finally finished, I told him he was a traitor to the African people. I went through the whole thing, about the connection between the FBI and the CIA, about what the FBI had done with the Black Panthers, Fred Hampton, Mark Clark; and Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, within this country. Then I mentioned how in Africa the CIA had organized a *coup* against Kwame Nkrumah, and had actually murdered Patrice Lumumba. I went on down the line. I said, how could you possibly do this? Then he said he was sorry he'd called me if he had upset me. I said I was glad he had called, I was glad that I had the opportunity to say what I wanted to say to him, and he just said he was sorry, that he wouldn't bother me again.

After the call, I started to be concerned about being contacted. I began to wonder why, with my background, the CIA would contact me. In a way I was personally incensed, how dare they? I tried to figure out what it was. Either they hadn't done their homework, which I doubt very seriously, or they thought that if they could get me, a black psychologist who knows African history, African politics, and who had been involved in political organizations for some time, they would have a perfect person.

I had been assuming they would think I couldn't be bought, but why should they think that? They've obviously bought other people, this was just one more person. Obviously I wanted to go to Africa; maybe they could make me think I was doing some service to the African people. So after I thought about it, it began to make a little sense. I thought they would think, well, even if she says no, she wouldn't go public because of all the paranoia. But my feeling was that it is better to be in the open about it. I felt I had to let African people know what is happening, so that they can protect themselves. That is more important than personal considerations.

That was when I arranged for the interview with WHUR. I figured if they were beginning to seek out black professionals in the psychology department, if they were already getting names, this was a very destructive sequence of events. I didn't know where it would stop. So I talked to the people at WHUR, and did an interview with them, several weeks after it happened, explaining what had happened and what implications it had for the black community, because Howard is the foremost black institution in the U.S. The fact that they are recruiting and using Howard as a training ground was extremely important for black people to know, to be aware of. The interview was taped, and a small part of it was played on the 5:15 news summary, a summary of what is coming later. Then, about 45 minutes later, at the time for the regular airing, the tape was mysteriously missing. As far as I know, WHUR never found out what happened to the tape.

CAIB: What did you do then?

KM: I decided to go back to Maryland to talk to both people who were involved in giving names. I did just that. I went back and talked first with the director. I asked him how he could give out names to the CIA, and first he said, well, he didn't give out my name. I told him that it did not matter, that he was still acting as a CIA agent whether he realized it or not. He became quite angry that I had come to him because he hadn't given anyone my name. He said that

they come to him for all sorts of information. I should add here that Roy Savoy was a student at the University of Maryland. He had just graduated in the last year or so, and he came to the director as an ex-student now working for the CIA and interested in having some names of people to do whatever. Perhaps that made it a little more palatable to him.

CAIB: How did he justify this with his political beliefs?

KM: I asked him that. I said, with all that you've done, how could you give names to the CIA? You know what the CIA has done to our people. He repeated that he didn't give the names of any students. He was really upset, and at first I don't think he realized the implications of what he had done. He asked if I was questioning his commitment, and I said that I was; it wasn't the words that mattered, it was the actions.

His rationale for what he had done was that they could have gotten the names anyway, so he didn't feel that he was giving away anything they couldn't find out themselves. I explained that by giving them certain names from the Department he was giving them information, he was telling them which professors would be the most likely to have information about black students. He saved them from having to go through the Department Chair, who might not have had the knowledge of the black students and professors that the director of a black program did.

We eventually talked for a long while, and finally he said he had learned a lot from our discussion and would never do that again. He just hadn't realized the implications of what he was doing. He is a serious person, and I never thought he would do what he had done purposely. So he was another of those unwitting agents.

Then I went to see Oscar Barbarin, who had actually given my name. Barbarin at that time had been at the University of Maryland about three years. We are both members of the Association of Black Psychologists. I've known him since about 1973, and he knows my political persuasion and the many activities I've been involved in.

CAIB: Had he been supportive of it?

KM: Certainly. He was concerned about black people, and I don't think he would ever consciously do anything against black people. I went to see him, and I was furious. He knew what it was about; he was physically upset; he knew why I was there. I don't know whether the director had called him, or he just knew that in a matter of time I'd be there. I asked him how he could do it, how he could give the CIA my name? He said that a number of government agencies come to him for names and information; he saw the CIA as just another government agency. I was shocked that he would even say that. I told him that he was supposed to be politically aware, that he had to know what the CIA has been doing, not only in Africa but also around the world. And he said he never stopped to think about it. He said that after he gave them my name he realized maybe he shouldn't have done it but then it was too late.

CAIB: Did he say what they asked him for, what sort of criteria they had when they were asking for names?

KM: He said that they were looking for black people

who wanted to go to work in Africa. Barbarin knew that I knew a lot about African history, African politics, as well as having been politically active. He said he didn't think I would be interested but I might give them the names of people who would be interested. I told him that was even worse. Not only was he acting as an agent for the CIA, but he was assuming that I would also act as one. I told him that he had no idea what he was doing, that he could get me killed, just by having my name on a list. He said he was really sorry, and he didn't realize the implications of what he had done, and he was very upset that I would call him a CIA agent. But I told him that was the role he was playing, whether he realized it or not. That's the key point to me; a lot of people don't realize what they are doing and they are getting a lot of other people involved in something they have no idea about. Or they are closing their eyes to it; they don't want to face the fact that if they turn down the CIA, they might jeopardize some funding or grants. Perhaps they want to cooperate so it won't interfere with the development of their careers.

Right after this, I called the Association of Black Psychologists, and I told them the CIA is recruiting black psychologists to go to Africa. Savoy had already contacted them and they knew his name. We discussed how dangerous it was for African people all over the world. The CIA knows that wherever African people are, we could fit in—in Africa, the Caribbean, South America—all they have to do is train us, teach us the language, teach us the particular customs, and we'll fit right in. They've already used black people from this country to infiltrate liberation movements and progressive groups both in Africa and in the Caribbean, basically using one group of African people against another.

We started to talk about the conference in St. Louis we had coming up in August. They told me that Roy Savoy had already inquired about the conference which was to take place, and wanted to set up a booth. I asked them to call the people in St. Louis and alert them.

When I went to St. Louis, I found out that Roy Savoy was there, had his name tag on, had set up a room, and was already recruiting. The communications were really bad, and somehow he got in through the St. Louis people.

I managed to get the executive committee to allow me a few minutes to explain my experience with Roy Savoy, and to point out that he was already at their convention. A lot of them were shocked. He had registered openly as CIA, and I tried to explain the implications of this to them as an organization. They proceeded to get rid of him then, but by that time he had already contacted a number of students and professionals. I began to speak with people there and realized that a number of professionals around the country had been contacted. Not only professors at Maryland, but also professors at Howard, and elsewhere, had given names.

What I'm saying is that it is not just me as an individual; many students and professionals are being contacted. Just the other day a student at Howard told me he'd been contacted by the CIA, and he was angry too.

CAIB: It sounds from all the evidence that they are doing blanket recruiting, that they will contact a large number of people, and be turned down by so many percent, and so many percent will agree. If you said no, well, you were just

one. What they didn't count on is your going public, and we should talk a bit about that, about why you feel it is important to go public.

KM: I guess it's most important for African people to understand the implications of all this—what these people have done in the past, who they are, what their connections are. The major corporations are tied up with the police and the intelligence network, as well as the military. And a lot of people look at the spy programs on TV and think there's nothing wrong with being a spy, all these people have exciting lives and are doing a service to their country. People must understand that they are not doing a service to us in America, they're doing a service to the large corporations and to the American government, and to maintain profits—but in terms of our lives, all the FBI and CIA have done for us as a people is to kill us and our leaders and to destroy our organizations, not only here but around the world. They're doing it through our institutions, through our black organizations—they're recruiting us and we think we're doing a service to our people when actually we're helping to destroy our people.

It's important that people understand this and begin to work against it, to expose it every time it happens. I know of about ten people at Howard and other places who had been contacted, and not one of them had said a word. Yet, when I spoke up, they began to say, you know, they contacted me too. But they just kept it to themselves and were angry about it. You have to expose this, to let people know you've been contacted, and it's easier to do that once we all do it. Then there isn't as much paranoia and suspicion, and we have each other's support against retaliation.

CAIB: What kind of rap were these students given?

KM: Basically the same kind of thing, that they would be helping the African people and they would be working against communism. That's been played up so much both in Africa and here that a lot of people think they would be doing a service. Also a lot of black psychologists have gone to Africa, and a lot more want to go. There is a big push toward African psychology, and if you want to know anything about it, well you have to go to Africa, and this is a way to go to Africa. Sometimes they do this very indirectly, and people don't know under whose auspices they're going. They're just getting the money to go.

I should mention that all of this applies to foreign students too. The CIA has a program where they recruit "nationals"—people born in a particular country—to go back to that country as a CIA agent. We should talk about the dangers here. These students need to be alerted, need to understand whose agents they are if they work with the CIA. They will not be working in the interests of their people, but working against them.

CAIB: How would you sum this all up for our readers?

KM: I want to make the point of how organized this recruiting effort really is, and how dangerous it can be, not just to African people, but also to all people of the "Third World." At this point in time, in the "Third World" in general, and the African countries (Africa and the Caribbean) in particular, the masses of people are rising up against the



old order characterized by centuries of colonialism and neo-colonialism. The CIA has had a long history of interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. By putting down just rebellions of the people, destabilizing governments, destroying organizations, planning and financing *coups*, and murdering leaders, the CIA has attempted to change the course of history in places like the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Jamaica, Cuba, Chile, Iran, the Congo, Ghana and Angola, just to name a few.

In the African world they have found it much easier to infiltrate by using black agents rather than white. In fact, it was black CIA agents, born in America, who were instrumental in the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966 and in the invasion of Guinea in 1970.

This use of black against black is also reflected in the position Andy Young occupies as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In that capacity he travels throughout the African world, seeking to make American imperialist policy more digestible simply because it comes in black hands rather than white. African leaders aware of this ploy have told him it won't work. The revolution of the African world is not the civil rights struggle of the 60s. The people will not be placated, they will not be bought off.

This new consciousness not only informs the people of past transgressions but also brings with it new vigilance which alerts them to potential CIA agents. Based on the recent overthrow of the U.S.-supported oppressive and exploitative government of Eric Gairy in Grenada, one might expect the CIA to attempt to overthrow or intervene in the affairs of the New Revolutionary Government of Grenada. But the people are organized against such interference. The CIA reign around the world is coming to an end.

We must not become the enemies of our people. We must organize against all CIA activity. We must fight the CIA.

Subversive Academicians

Below are excerpts from a paper by Robert Molteno, a Black South African, entitled "Hidden Sources of Subversion: North American Academics and the Southern Africa Struggle." The paper was first presented at a conference on Socio-Economic Trends and Policies on Southern Africa at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1975, sponsored by the U.N.'s African Institute for Economic Development and Planning.

Molteno was a lecturer in politics at the University of Zambia, Lusaka, where he worked from 1968 to 1976, and much of the information in his article was obtained at first hand, as he was "consulted by the relevant authorities with each new stage in the attempt to penetrate the liberation movements, and therefore am able to quote from the files of relevant correspondence." Molteno now resides in England.

"Hidden Sources of Subversion" was published in the April 1976 issue of African Youth, newsletter of the African Youth Movement for Liberation and Unity. We regret that the article and its many reference notes are too lengthy to be republished in full here. In the first part of his paper, Molteno described the studies in South Africa conducted

by Professor Gwendolyn Carter and her associates, Thomas Karis, Newell Stultz, Sheridan Johns III, and Gail Gerhart, beginning in the late 1940s and continuing into the early 1970s.

Carter began with a study of the Afrikaner power establishment; Stultz investigated the origins of Afrikaner nationalism; Karis and Johns studied the threat to Afrikaner nationalism posed by the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC); Johns examined the South African Communist Party (SACP); and Gerhart began a study of the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which is as yet unfinished. Molteno showed the connections between these scholars and the State Department, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, at Stanford University.

Although this group of scholars is still preoccupied with Southern Africa, its work has been eclipsed by others devoted to the study of guerrilla warfare. Beginning in the late 1960s with the sharp escalation of armed struggle in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique, a new group of specialists appeared on the scene. Molteno devoted the major portion of his article to them.

THE CIA AND STUDIES ON GUERRILLA WARFARE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

by Robert Molteno

The liberation wars in Southern Africa escalated rapidly in the late 1960's. MPLA opened its very successful Eastern front in Angola in 1966, the same year as SWAPO reacted to the World Court judgment on Namibia by starting low-keyed armed struggle in Owambo and the Caprivi strip. The following year, 1967, joint ZAPU/ANC(SA) forces began a series of campaigns (1967-70) which, although defeated, forced South Africa to send in troops to prop up the Smith regime. FRELIMO then opened the second Tete Province Front and in 1972 ZANU started what proved to be a sustained and ever-expanding zone of combat in Northeastern and Eastern Zimbabwe. These immense successes—sketched so hastily here, but involving so much sacrifice and courage—clearly showed the U.S. Government that the days of white minority rule were numbered, unless something was done about it.

The USA has had for a long time a CIA presence in Zambia. Let me be brief, but specific. The CIA presence has taken several forms of which the following are known to the author:

*a) American academics who come to Zambia and who then (or previously?) join the CIA. The best documented, but not widely known, case is Dr. Stephen Goodman. He was an economist who taught at the University of Zambia soon after it opened in 1966. He subsequently wrote an article in *Africa Report* (June 1970), which stated he "specialises in Southern African research for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency." The second case was Dr. John Helgerson who in 1970 did his doctoral research for Duke University on the Zambian National Assembly and its MPs. He now works in Washington, according to two friends of his, for the CIA.*

b) *CIA agents stationed in the U.S. Embassy, Lusaka.* The stationing of CIA agents within U.S. embassies is common practice. In Lusaka, the U.S. Embassy has always had at least one official, often with the cover post of consular officer, whose job is to penetrate the liberation movements. In 1968, the man was Frank Crump. In 1974 it was Clagett J. Taylor and possibly Mike D. Stempel.* Clagett Taylor has an interesting history. Some years ago, he was a teacher in Rhodesia and came to know several Zimbabwean leaders. He then (so he told me) decided to join the State Department and had to learn Spanish as a second language. Some time afterwards, he was posted to the U.S. Embassy, Lusaka, Zambia. There he suffered the unfortunate experience of being exposed.

It happened this way: For years, it was known that the Mozambican organization COREMO was a puppet body of small size that was being supported by the United States as an alternative to the radical and mass-supported FRELIMO. But only in early 1975 did Paul Guma, COREMO's head, admit publicly that Mr. Clagett Taylor of the U.S. Embassy in Lusaka had been financing COREMO at least since the April 1974 coup in Portugal. Mr. Guma stated that Clagett Taylor had instructed COREMO to act against FRELIMO in that crucial period before Portugal recognised FRELIMO as its legitimate successor. The U.S. Government hastily redeployed Mr. Taylor to Caracas, Venezuela. This rather reduced the weight of the U.S. Embassy denial that Taylor had been subsidising COREMO from CIA funds.

The CIA's other activities in Zambia: These include notably the setting up of Nkumbi International College, where many young people from the liberation movements went to school under largely American teachers. The Zambian Government took over the college after documentation came to light showing the College's links with U.S. Government foreign policy. The second case has been a series of CIA attempts to penetrate the Zambian labor movement. These attempts used the African-American Labor Center—known in radical labor circles to be a CIA front, and an attempt in 1973 by Mr. Mike Stempel of the U.S. Embassy to use a University of Zambia lecturer as an intermediary between CIA agents who flew in from Malawi and the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions.


It is against this background that the attempts by U.S. academics to penetrate the liberation movements must be seen.

Case 1: MIT, Professor Griffith, and Robert M. Bates

So far as I can find out, the first major U.S. academic attempt to use Zambia as a base from which to investigate guerrilla warfare goes back to early 1969. In March of that year, Professor Lincoln Bloomfield, director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)'s Center for International Studies' "arms control project," designed and carried out CONEX III. CONEX III was a sophisticated (two-day-long, TV-monitored, and with computer-pro-

cessed data) simulation of the likely conduct of U.S. and other leaders in a Southern African conflict situation. This simulation was part of the Center's project to study "the control [*sic*—by the USA?] of local conflict." Two findings emerged which must have alarmed U.S. policy makers. The first was that, as the Southern African conflict escalated, so socialist (Soviet and Chinese) support for freedom fighters soared, and the USSR also lent Zambia SAM-2's for her protection. The second finding was that the USA refused to take any action; in the words of the report of the simulation, "The U.S. would let the regional conflict run its course without substantial assistance or intervention." (Incidentally, it may be of interest to political scientists to see how tragically wrong this latter finding of the "game" has proved to be: see the open CIA money, arms, planes and mercenaries in Angola at the present time.)

Soon after this simulation, a new event happened which further shook the U.S. Government. In 1970 China finally agreed firmly to build the TanZam Railway from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to Kapiri Mposhi in Zambia over a period of five years. Actual construction started in 1970. It was shortly after this that Professor W.E. Griffith of MIT visited Zambia. Griffith, who incidentally is *Ford* Professor of Political Science, is an old Cold War warrior whose record goes back nearly 30 years. In an amusing interview with the author, Professor Griffith expressed skepticism when told that there were almost no Chinese in Lusaka. His skepticism unfortunately was soon to bear fruit in a new MIT initiative.



*Editors' Note: Our research indicates it is unlikely that Crump, Taylor or Stempel were official CIA employees. It is clear from Molteno's description, however, that they worked closely with the Agency.

On 19 October 1970, Professor Robert I. Rotberg of the Department of Political Science, MIT, wrote to the head of Political Science at the University of Zambia: "I hope that you and other members of your department may want to take part in a study of the politics, psychology and tactics of African liberation movements . . . Their internal dynamics are little understood, and their potential as revolutionaries (from a methodological point of view) is little known." The Department of Political Science at the University of Zambia (UNZA)—led by its South African members—saw the obvious dangers (to Zambia and the liberation movements) of such a project. There was also the extraordinary lack of information which Rotberg had provided. We began by asking four questions: What is the purpose of the study? Where are its funds coming from? Who will the researchers be? And what is the intended time span? The Head of Political Science communicated these questions to Rotberg, who replied as follows on 30 December 1970 (my comments follow in brackets):

1) "I hope that several of our Ph.D. candidates could gather thesis material in Zambia." [i.e., most of the researchers would be Americans]

2) "The ideal minimum duration of the study is five years." [i.e., this was not to be a normal research project of limited duration, but an ongoing monitoring of the liberation movements]

3) "At the moment we have money for about a year from MIT. An application has been made to the Ford Foundation." [Clearly Rotberg was in a hurry, got university financial support immediately, and then turned for larger scale funds to a Foundation which, as we have seen, had been active in South Africa before.]

Rotberg then made a crucial mistake. When pressed by the UNZA political science staff as to whether he had asked and got the support of anyone in the liberation movements, he replied with only one name—an African academic associated with one of the movements. I then spoke to this person, who denied having consented to collaborate with the project and who expressed his shock at its implications. This the Department communicated to Rotberg in due course, presumably much to his embarrassment.

The Department also examined Rotberg's Research Proposal, which he had now sent us. It was clearly hostile to liberation and aiming to do a very thorough job of penetrating the movements. The proposal stated, "Almost every African country is a present or a potential target [*sic*] of a liberationist movement." ('Liberationist' is a cute new word, presumably to be equated in connotation with communist or extremist.) He also put "Liberated" inside quotation marks, thereby further betraying his attitude. But Rotberg was not just hostile; his intentions were manipulative as well and so closely related to U.S. Government policy. Thus, Reason No. (3) for studying the liberation movements was:

To learn about the strategy and tactics of liberation movements is to gain knowledge about small-scale internal and external wars and how such wars may be promoted, contained, or prevented.

As for the scope of the five-year study, it would include:

an analysis of their operational attitudes—their techniques of recruitment, training, mobilization, and communications in their target areas, their strategy and tactics, their leadership and internal politics, and their ideology and international relations. In its initial phase the study will concentrate on the more important movements, those directed against [*sic*] South Africa, South West Africa, Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and Malawi. . . . Data will be collected by structured interview, survey, participant observation [!!!], and analysis of printed ephemera, the press, and other records.

It is clear, I suggest, that this proposed research was as comprehensive and detailed as anything military intelligence could desire.

UNZA's Department of Political Science was unanimous that the study must be blocked. As one member of the Department (not myself) wrote in an internal minute on 22 January, 1971, "I am sure I would not be alone in reading possible sinister motives into the proposed project. . . . Our best course of action would be to prevent actively on the grounds that it would compromise the activities of other research students, is unlikely to succeed, and is embarrassing to Government if not to the liberation movements themselves."

When the Department turned down Rotberg's proposal on 12 February, 1971, he was furious. On 8 April, he replied to the Head of the Department: "I was a little surprised at your letter of 12 February. . . . By rejecting co-operation out of hand, you obviously limit the extent to which your Department can influence the shape of the work. . . . I fully understand the underlying theme of your letter and even what I take to be a possible anti-American tone."

Still Rotberg refused to give the project up, and he said he would fly out to Zambia in mid-1971. There now existed a very real danger that Rotberg would use his contacts with very high levels of the Zambian Government, misrepresent his project, and get permission to go ahead. So the Department did two things: First, it alerted key liberation movements (ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, and ZANU). They were unanimous that "this research would not be countenanced by the liberation movements; they felt it was ideologically unacceptable, politically inopportune, and practically unfeasible. It was their unanimous opinion, most forcefully expressed, that they would not be prepared to go along with the outlined research proposal." Secondly, the Department alerted the Vice Chancellor and the Director of the University's Institute of African Studies (IAS). They agreed in the words of the Director, "It is clear that UNZA should on no account be associated in any form with this incredible (indeed, crazy) and, if I may say so, politically suspect project. I would go further and suggest that this

man with his dangerous 'research' should be kept out of the country altogether." The Vice Chancellor agreed and on 1 June, took appropriate action to stop the project. This did not stop Rotberg from flying into Zambia and trying to persuade the Zambian Government directly—apparently without success. It has since been learned that he (like Carter and the others before him) is now engaged in the study of African political activity in the Bantustans, the South African Government having let him into South Africa for this purpose.

The Department naively thought that this had put a permanent end to American attempts to infiltrate liberation movements via placing academics in Zambia. We were wrong. And the reason we were wrong was that we did not foresee the likely U.S. reaction to the huge increase in the liberation wars which FRELIMO and ZANU brought about from 1972 on.

Case 3: Dr. Bowyer Bell, Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies, and Dr. Sheridan Johns III

In 1973 Sheridan Johns found himself working at the Institute of Communist Studies at Columbia University. His office happened to be near that of Dr. J. Bowyer Bell, who worked at Columbia's Institute of War and Peace Studies. Bowyer Bell is a man of considerable eminence in the hazy field between rightwing academia and U.S. intelligence services. His field of specialty is guerrilla struggles and he has written extensively on the subject. There are other interesting details about Bowyer Bell. He is extremely well off, having a house not only in the United States, but also in the exclusive Rutland Gate area of London. Although he himself says, "I can always be persuaded to write 50 pages for a thousand dollars," he must have a much more lucrative source of income than publication fees. Bowyer Bell works closely with the U.S. Government. When he travels around the world's war zones, as he frequently does, he often stays with U.S. Embassy officials and he admits that most of his information on freedom fighters comes from governmental sources. It is not surprising to discover that Bowyer Bell is extremely hostile to liberation movements. Thus on his visit to Rhodesia he was given lots of confidential information by the Rhodesian military. As he admits, "All the relevant departments of the Rhodesia Government offered the most detailed and generous cooperation." His article reflected the bias of this cooperation.

As early as 1969/70, Bowyer Bell became interested in the Southern African liberation war situation. He visited Lusaka (skillfully not calling at the University of Zambia), Dar es Salaam and Addis Ababa, as well as being taken round Rhodesia. It seems that Bowyer Bell was at MIT at this time; he certainly was two years later. If so, his Southern African trip may well have been a precursor of the large-scale Rotberg project which saw the light of day in 1970.

The next time Bowyer Bell became involved in Southern Africa was in late 1973. By this time he was at the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, where he met Johns. Luckily for Bell, he had also made the acquaintance of a member of staff at the University of Zambia when Bell had been investigating the guerrilla

situation in another part of Africa. Avoiding Rotberg's formal approach to the Department of Political Science, Bowyer Bell wrote privately to this acquaintance of his in March, 1974, asking him to sound out the liberation movements about whether they would be prepared to cooperate in being investigated. The letter is an extraordinary one, which was unfortunate for him, since he was incorrect in assuming that his acquaintance would be sympathetic to his purposes. The letter described his research project briefly as "a vast trans-national study out of Columbia" of the nationalist movements "and their ilk." The research was apparently to be one solely by Americans, thereby avoiding the complications which Rotberg's had got into in approaching non-American political scientists to cooperate. In other respects, however, the project was clearly the same as Rotberg's 1970/71 proposal—the same range of countries, the same comprehensive coverage of movements, and the same indefinite duration. Bell then made another mistake—he states that Dan Johns was shortly coming to Zambia (as a Fulbright Senior Lecturer from June 1974) and that he would brief Johns fully about the project and Johns could then spearhead its Zambian end.


What happened then is instructive. Details of the intended research and Bowyer Bell's background were given to one of the liberation movements. This movement circulated this information amongst the others and took it to the newspapers. The net result was that Johns found it virtually impossible to contact Liberation Centre and the movements after his arrival. It seems that at least the Zambian end of Bell's project has been successfully scotched. An interesting final detail is that Johns repeatedly denied all knowledge of the project. And since Bowyer Bell had stated in his letter that unfortunately he could not manage Africa "on my terrorism tour this year," we were not able to ask him for more details!

Case 4: Professor Ali Mazrui

At the very time that Bowyer Bell was setting up his project in early 1974, a similar initiative was being taken by Professor Mazrui. At first sight, Professor Mazrui's liberation struggle project is different from its predecessors. After all, he is a citizen of an African state and his approach was through the newly formed African Association of Political Science (AAPS). It is my contention that Mazrui's initiative, although much more skillful than the previous ones, was in fact the same U.S. penetration project, this time with a heavier camouflage.

What in fact happened? On 20 February 1974, he wrote to a member of the Political Science Department at the University of Dar es Salaam. Mazrui requested him to bring before the next executive meeting of the African Association of Political Science an application for recognition. "We are applying to be recognised by the Association as a Research Committee on Armed Forces in African Societies." If one turns to the enclosed memorandum on this Research Committee, one discovers some very interesting things. Firstly, the "we" is never explained. Presuming Professor Mazrui does not use the "Royal We" when referring to himself, it is a legitimate inference to suppose he has some American colleagues whose names he prefers not to disclose. Secondly, the projected Committee's con-

cern with liberation movements is buried amongst seven other topics. Thirdly, the proposal was apparently drafted in such a hurry (is this related to the rapid escalation in the armed freedom struggle in Mozambique and Zimbabwe in early 1974?) that Mazrui had no time to get the consent of the projected other founder members of his Committee; nor apparently did Professor Mazrui regard it as proper for the African Association of Political Science's Executive itself to appoint members to its own Committee!



There are other points to note about this proposal. Professor Mazrui was an opponent of President Milton Obote, who was a militant foe of apartheid; indeed Mazrui welcomed the *coup* of General Amin publicly. When he left Africa he accepted a University of Michigan offer (worth some \$70,000 per annum, all told) to join their staff. But it was as Senior Visiting Fellow at the Hoover Institution that he wrote to the AAPS. Since he does not submit any request for funds to the AAPS, perhaps he was already confident of getting funds from American sources. Finally, Mazrui was a close colleague of another academic concerned with monitoring liberation movements—Robert Rotberg. They had indeed edited a book together.

The skill of Mazrui's attempt was considerable. It used an African citizen as the public initiator of the project and then tried to get the stamp of legitimacy via affiliation to the AAPS. The location of the liberation section of the Committee would have been Dar es Salaam—a sensible choice both in view of the failures to get into Zambia and the importance of Tanzania in relation to FRELIMO, MPLA, ANC(SA), ZANU and ZAPU. (Remember that this attempt, like Bowyer Bell's, was *before* the Portuguese coup of April 1974.) And being a committee, it would also be an ongoing institution, highly suitable for longterm monitoring of the liberation wars. Luckily, the African Association of Political Science saw through the whole ploy and turned it down.

Let us finally turn to the last and most recent case.

Case 5: Dr. C.P. Potholm, Bowdoin College, and the Rockefeller Foundation

Within a couple of months of the collapse of the Bowyer Bell and Mazrui attempts in 1974, another one was made—this time by Professor Christian P. Potholm of Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine. His research proposal was as follows:

This study seeks to focus on the international transfer of aid (to refugees) particularly as it affects Africa and is designed to develop strategies to: (i) increase the generation of aid (ii) ensure that the African nations receive a greater percentage of the total and (iii) co-ordinate and maximise the flow of international refugee relief to Africa.

Since almost the only refugees in Lusaka are from the unliberated territories of Southern Africa and since they are mostly activists in the various liberation movements, Potholm's research on refugees would in effect have given him full access (from January to May 1975) to all the liberation movements. But this research proposal clearly could not reflect Potholm's real purposes. For, as the Department of Political and Administrative Studies (as it was now called) stated when consulted, "He is suggesting that by coming to Zambia to talk to various people about refugee aid he will be in a position to help increase the flow and effectiveness of aid." The subject then rejected the proposal—"the research proposal of Potholm does not appear . . . to represent serious scholarship." Or, as the Director of IAS wrote on 7 October 1974, "it is couched in very attractive terms and one wonders whether this is a smokescreen to blind us to what the man really wants to come and do."

What Potholm wanted to come and do soon became even clearer. His source of funds provided one clue: "I have recently received the good news that the Rockefeller Foundation [that old financier of Gwen Carter's research] will be sponsoring my research project dealing with international aid and refugee resettlement with particular emphasis on Southern Africa." But it was his curriculum vitae that gave the game away. The following facts emerged:

- 1) Potholm had never been interested in aid or refugees before.
- 2) Potholm's association with Rockefeller went years back to the period 1958-62 when he held a Rockefeller Scholarship at Bowdoin College.
- 3) Potholm also had close links with the State Department; in 1971 he was awarded what his curriculum vitae called "Scholar-Diplomat Seminar for African Affairs, U.S. State Department."
- 4) Under "Field of Major Research Interest," he listed four areas, of which the first was "International Espionage Sub-cultures"!!
- 5) His interest in spying and his general rightwing sympathy was borne out by some of his publications. These included several on the police and "insurgency techniques" in Africa, as well as a revealing article entitled "Rejuvenation of the ROTC Program," the ROTC being the Reserve

Officers Training Corps which operates on American campuses.

On 12 November 1974, the IAS wrote to Potholm, "The subject you have chosen is not one which falls within the research priorities of the country at this stage." Potholm never replied.

General Conclusions

As liberation wars rise in intensity and scale, so certain American academics become more persistent in their attempts to penetrate and monitor the liberation movements. When the wars in Zimbabwe and South Africa escalate, we must expect further attempts.

These U.S. academics who are reactionary refuse to take NO for an answer; they merely resort to more subtle subterfuges. These include the withholding of relevant information; misrepresentation of research intentions; use of black intermediaries; bypassing the relevant authorities, etc.

In the period since 1969, one can detect the same old close ties between rightwing USA academics, think-tanks, foundations and the U.S. Government as existed in the earlier period.

The first duty of the radical intellectual in this situation is vigilance. The second is to inform the liberation movements. Academics who ally themselves with imperialism in Southern Africa must be held in general condemnation as the enemies of freedom.

THE ACADEMIC SUBVERSIVE TODAY

by Ken Lawrence

Readers of Robert Molteno's article cannot help but be impressed with the boldness and persistence of these U.S. researchers in attempting to insinuate themselves into the midst of the Southern African liberation movements. Although Molteno has detailed how these scholars were thwarted, it is only reasonable to assume that other U.S. agents operating under deeper cover have succeeded where they failed and are busily conducting their dirty work.

Meanwhile, several of those exposed by Molteno are continuing to oppose the liberation movements in other ways. J. Bowyer Bell's recent titles include *The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies*, *On Revolt: Strategies of National Liberation*, and *A Time of Terror: How Democratic Societies Respond to Revolutionary Violence*. Bell and William Griffith were listed as participants in a recent seminar on "Political Violence Abroad: Its Impact on American Business," sponsored by Probe, Inc., in New York City. (Bell is on Probe, Inc.'s Board of Advisors, along with William Colby, among others.) Ali Mazrui believes he and his colleagues are considered "too Westernized" to be influential among Africans; no longer a supporter of Idi Amin, Mazrui now advocates the "Kenya model" as the policy for Zimbabwe's future.

Some of those Molteno exposed merit additional consideration: the scholars at the Hoover Institution and MIT's Robert I. Rotberg. Much of our information wasn't available to Molteno in Zambia, a problem he himself noted.

The Hoover Institution

Boasting the largest private archive in the United States, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace (founded after World War I by Herbert Hoover as Stanford University's Hoover War Collection and known as the Hoover War Library from 1922 until 1957) has long enjoyed a cozy relationship with the U.S. intelligence agencies (it ran a Civil Communications Intelligence School during World War II, for example). At least in part that's because its files predate theirs by several decades and include gems like the Archive of the Imperial Russian Secret Police (Okhrana), obtained from the Tsar's Ambassador to France after the Russian Revolution.

Herbert Hoover told the Stanford trustees in 1959, "The purpose of the Institution must be, by its research and publications, to demonstrate the evils of the doctrines of Karl Marx—whether Communism, Socialism, economic materialism, or atheism—thus to protect the American way of life from such ideologies, their conspiracies, and to reaffirm the validity of the American system." A writer in the *New York Times Magazine* (July 23, 1978) noted that "what once seemed a backwater of American intellectual and political life has spilled into the mainstream," because "the staunch anti-Communism that unites the Hoover scholars, whatever their differences of opinion on other matters, no longer seems out-of-step with the times."

The Hoover Institution's African collection began in 1919 when the Belgian and German governments donated

official documents and reports on their colonies, but extensive acquisition of materials on Africa did not begin until 1956. As that collection expanded, the role of the Institution changed from repository to advocate—in this case providing strong support for the South African government.

In 1968 a book appeared, *The Third Africa*, printed by National Commercial Printers, Ltd., in South Africa, and published by Twin Circle Publishing Company in New York. Its author, Dr. Eschel Rhoodie, was described as a journalist and scholar; the book modestly proclaimed itself “by far the most comprehensive work on Southern Africa and probably the best researched book yet to appear in this country dealing with past and future trends in Southern Africa.” The concluding chapter was written by Dr. Stefan Possony, the Hoover Institution’s Director of International Studies, former Naval Intelligence psychological warfare officer, and Strategy and Military Affairs Editor of the American Security Council. Reference to Possony’s position with the Hoover Institution graces the title page.

The Third Africa was an infantile effort at promoting South Africa. Probably the most striking thing about the book is the use of the lower case spelling “negro” in Possony’s chapter, as against the capitals for all other races and nationalities, including White. (Remember, this was the era of Black Power in the U.S.) The rest of the book capitalizes Negro. Rhoodie rebuffs South Africa’s critics for pages on end, while Possony provides racist reference points against which whites can measure South Africa’s “separate development” policy, as in his reference to characteristics of “the negro family—the frequency of mother domination, of illegitimacy, of children by different fathers, and of vanishing fathers with a weak urge to work.”

Now more than ten years have passed. In 1974 Eschel Rhoodie became the South African government’s Secretary of Information. Prior to that time his government’s promotions were mostly openly sponsored propaganda, like his book, but upon taking office he announced that the policy had to change, and that eventually “50 to 60 percent of the Department’s methods would be ‘hidden’, not in the sense of secrecy or subversion, but on an indirect basis.” Just how literally Rhoodie meant this was revealed last year when an investigation of the so-called Information scandal revealed that one of his schemes was to finance secretly the purchase of newspapers, magazines, and other journals in Britain, the United States, France, and other parts of Africa, as well as the English-language newspaper, *The Citizen*, in South Africa itself. (Rhoodie fled the country in disgrace after investigations revealed that he had diverted sizeable amounts of the secret funds to his personal use. In March, General Hendrik van den Bergh, the former head of the South African secret police, the Bureau of State Security, was sent to Europe “to prevent Dr. Eschel Rhoodie from carrying out his threat to reveal further details of the secret projects of the now defunct Department of Information.” Rhoodie could become South Africa’s John Dean; news reports indicate his information includes secret payments to Members of the U.S. Congress and at least one Presidential candidate.)

Of course, Possony’s overtly racist writing was not the

only work on Southern Africa at the Hoover Institution. Peter J. Duignan, referred to in the *New York Times* as “a respected scholar of African history” and “a lifelong Democrat” has been curator of the African collection since 1959. By 1963 the collection included 20,000 books, 400 bound volumes of government documents, and 10,000 unbound items covering the years from 1870 to the present, while subscribing to 275 periodicals and 40 newspapers, all together “the most valuable single collection of documents on African affairs in this country.”

At that time the research program was “addressed to the problem of what United States policy should be toward the emerging African states” at a time when “American officials have become increasingly concerned with Africa and have begun to fear the consequences of rapid decolonization.” A study of Communism in Africa was directed by Zbigniew Brzezinski; another project investigated African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia.

In addition, the next stage of research was projected:

Now is the time to reconsider and evaluate imperialism in Africa. With the old colonial empires being dismantled, the archives are now open. Research into these archives has the greatest relevance to current African studies and to the present tension between West and East over winning the support of the uncommitted peoples of the underdeveloped world. Since 1956 Soviet scholars have stepped up their work on Africa, with the aim of attacking the record of imperialism and presenting a picture of cruel exploitation and the cultural degradation of African societies. White rule, according to the Soviet scholars, meant a continual worsening of the African’s condition and great profits to Europe. Many African nationalists are now making similar charges. The records must be studied and dispassionately evaluated before we can set forth a more objective record of imperialism in Africa.

Perhaps to facilitate this dispassionate, objective study of imperialism, historian Lewis H. Gann was taken on by the Hoover Institution as a senior fellow. Duignan and Gann have jointly edited the Institution’s major work on Africa, a five-volume study of colonialism. Gann explained his own attitude toward imperialism in the preface to his book, *Central Africa*:

I am, in certain respects, the product of the colonial era. I have served in a colonial administration, and have done much of my scholarly work in institutions that were founded at the initiative of British imperialists. I reject neither my academic nor my professional past. Far from feeling indicted by the company I have kept, I find much of value in these associations. African studies in general owe an immeasurable debt to the by-products of European conquest. . . .

. . . Western imperialism as a whole entailed a far-reaching process of cultural transfusion. This is a phenomenon which, on the whole, I welcome. . . .

. . . As a European, I am sympathetic to white Rhodesians and their problems; this attachment has been reinforced by long residence in the country. . . .

Hoover Institution experts Duignan and Gann have established themselves as the scholarly advocates for the right-wing policy options available to the United States, with the approval of the South African information ministry. An article they wrote in the *Christian Science Monitor* (February 9, 1978), "Misjudging South Africa," arguing that "we" (the United States) should accelerate investment in South Africa, was reprinted in the weekly propaganda magazine published by the South African government, *South African Digest* (June 9, 1978). Their 37-page booklet, *South West Africa—Namibia*, published by the conservative American African Affairs Association, Inc., argues, "There is no better hope for Namibia and for the world at large than the ascendancy of the moderates." Their aim is the defeat of SWAPO. A recent anonymous mailing from New York to various U.S. media included a copy of this booklet (priced at \$2.50 a copy); a *Reader's Digest* reprint, "Russia's Ruthless Reach Into Africa"; and a South African government pamphlet on Soweto.** It isn't difficult to imagine who benefits from the Hoover Institution's studies in Southern Africa.

Last year Peter Duignan explained to a writer for *American Legion Magazine* (May 1978) how the Hoover Institution acquires the information: "We go on collecting trips every two years. For each country we try to get all government documents at all levels, annual reports, census reports; at least one newspaper from each country, journals of history, archaeology, linguistics, political science, biology, philosophy and religion, and publications of political parties and trade union movements."

Robert I. Rotberg

While the Hoover Institution was accelerating its studies of Africa on our West Coast in the early 1960s, Robert Rotberg was doing the same on the other side of the continent at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. Read by itself, an old article he wrote, "The Origins of Nationalist Discontent in East and Central Africa" (*Journal of Negro History*, April 1963), seems to be sympathetic to Africans and opposed to colonialism and imperialism. But in light of Molteno's revelations, one can only wonder if it was published as bait, to make its author appear to be a friend of liberation.

There is no need for guesswork in interpreting Rotberg's recent writings. Whereas Duignan and Gann's booklet on Namibia is intended primarily as propaganda, to provide U.S. opinion-makers with seemingly legitimate and respectable reasons for supporting South Africa's clients in Namibia and opposing SWAPO, Rotberg's recent study, "The New Namibia" (*The Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1978***), is obviously addressed to the covert operators and their special needs, and as such it is a much more honest piece.

**According to the U.S. Postal Service's Freedom of Information office, the postage meter number on the envelope is held by Herdan Services, Inc., of New York. In a telephone interview, one representative of Herdan Services said, "We send out mail for a lot of governments." Another said, "If it's South African material, it comes from South Africa."

***See *Covert Action Information Bulletin* Number 3 for the ties between Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, which publishes *The Washington Quarterly*, and the intelligence community.

Thus Duignan and Gann wrote, "SWAPO and its radical allies prefer a military solution to a political one, fearing that they could not win a peaceful election." Rotberg says, "In all likelihood SWAPO can emerge victorious from any free election." Duignan and Gann stress South Africa's legal claim to the Namibian port of Walvis Bay, but suggest in a footnote that a good compromise might be to declare Walvis Bay a free port. Rotberg's *realpolitik* says: "a new Namibia needs Walvis Bay. . . . Even if South Africa converted Walvis Bay into a free port, Namibia would forfeit customs revenues and might lose out to Walvis Bay in the competition for foreign investment."

Having bluntly set forth the facts, Rotberg proceeds to examine factors that might keep SWAPO from winning. Anxieties that an independent Namibia would lack "a pool of trained manpower sufficient to maintain the economy," he says, "could be mobilized under ideal circumstances, into a potent national movement capable of denying outright electoral victory to SWAPO." Other factors that might help the South Africa-backed Democratic Turnhalle Alliance are mentioned: "In addition to its ability to capitalize upon anti-Ovambo chauvinism, traditionalism, middle-class conservatism, and residual anxieties about change, the alliance can also draw on funds supplied from outside Namibia as well as from the business community within the territory." But none of that is very likely to work. "In sum, the alliance can turn itself from an elite into a mass political organization only by SWAPO miscalculation or some extraordinary, unanticipated good fortune."

Rotberg predicts SWAPO will win. That may not be as bad for imperialism as it seems, he thinks. "SWAPO assumed a pro-Soviet, radical sounding posture only recently, and for a long time it was bourgeois in rhetoric, while militant in action. It has followed an avowedly socialist approach only since 1970. Should we not question SWAPO's dedication to socialism as we question Joshua Nkomo's recent espousal of similar Soviet models?" Of course, if SWAPO does pursue a socialist course, Rotberg sees openings for future disruption in Namibia. "Economic and social dislocation, stemming from plummeting productivity, mismanagement of the infrastructure (and the ports), and conceptual rigidities, among other factors, encourage political disagreement; if political control, such as patronage, follows ethnic lines, it could engender resentment rooted in ethnicity." He concludes, "The potential for postindependence conflict is thus great, especially if intra-Ovambo rivalry becomes prominent."

Reading this, one can only admire Robert Molteno and his colleagues at the University of Zambia for denying this "scholar" access to the liberation movements through their offices. We might now be reading about the actual and potential weaknesses of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe in U.S. intelligence journals had the UNZA's Political Science Department approved Rotberg's research proposal.

Professor Rotberg of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is also an opinion-maker. His columns appear with increasing frequency in the *Christian Science Monitor*. Much of his analytical writing sounds deceptively liberal: "Andrew Young has been good for Africa." (June 29,

1977) "[South Africa's new prime minister] will want, in the first year, to commence some kind of process of consultation with the leaders of South Africa's black majority. That consultation could lead to peaceful evolution." (September 26, 1978) "Smith is letting the downward spiral of war destroy everything that has been created industrially and economically in Rhodesia." (January 3, 1979) "In this century South Africa has steadily eroded many human rights in the name of security. Most rights are consequently honored, but mainly in the breach." (March 7, 1979)

These are not lines the South African government likes to reprint for wide distribution, as it does with the writings that emanate from the Hoover Institution. But each time Rotberg makes an actual policy suggestion, it manages to fit well into the conservative framework from which U.S. options have been drawn all along. Thus last year, when the debate on divestment of companies doing business in South Africa was warming up in churches and on campuses across America, Rotberg argued that U.S. corporations should invest more, not less, money in South Africa. "Alas, it is unlikely that an American withdrawal, even if physically and legally practical, would have the impact on policy which its supporters suppose." (July 5, 1978) His proposal for Rhodesia is quite blunt: a military invasion. "Legally, Queen Elizabeth II still rules Rhodesia. It is a colony in rebellion against the Crown. Troops of the Queen, assisted logistically and financially by the United States, could resume control, sponsor and hold fair elections, and then transfer power to a majority government." (January 3, 1979)

Although this last suggestion has not been widely aired in the United States, it is a policy option the British Foreign Office has had under consideration since 1975, should the political circumstances allow it. Rotberg undoubtedly knows this, and is preparing the way for U.S. policymakers to endorse such a move. (Actually, the British plan is somewhat more complex and would involve the use of troops from several Commonwealth countries. What is new about Rotberg's proposal is the suggested logistical and financial support from the U.S., which, if actually offered, might tip the scales in favor of this option.)

Some closing thoughts

Now that Southern Africa is universally understood as one of the main arenas of world political struggle, the scramble for African studies is on. An article in the November 26, 1978, *Washington Post* calls this "Foreign Policy's New Growth Field." It lists the Aspen Institute's proposal to the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for a \$100,000 program for a panel of experts headed by Henry Kissinger to examine U.S. policy options in Southern Africa; a Pentagon-sponsored study of U.S. attitudes toward South Africa to be conducted jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies; and a \$1.5 million project under consideration by the Rockefeller Foundation to establish a commission on Africa "that would have the kind of prestige that White House-appointed panels normally enjoy." All these are almost correctly identified by the *Post* as "globalists," as opposed to "liberationists." ("Imperialists" would have

been too precise.)

One may confidently predict that these scholars will continue to project policies for the United States generally within the limits we have been discussing, with Hoover-type policies on the right and Rotberg's variety on the liberal "left." (Rotberg was one of those chosen by the U.S. government in 1976 to study how to aid "the transition" to majority rule at the time when Henry Kissinger and South Africa's Prime Minister Vorster were attempting to negotiate a settlement in Zimbabwe and Namibia. The study was to cover "such political questions as the ideological orientation of possible new leaders, ethnic rivalries, and the strategies of the international corporate and financial world," according to the Washington Office on Africa.) Safely bracketed within these alternatives, the political debate will open up plenty of room for "national interest" maneuvering, including covert action on a scale that has not been possible in Southern Africa since the CIA's debacle in Angola.



Eventually the policy-makers will give ground to the left, an inch at a time, as the white regimes collapse. (If they don't, we will witness yet another congressional report on "the failure of intelligence" together with recriminations about "who lost southern Africa." That, or else direct U.S. military intervention.) The problem is the likelihood they'll get away with this long enough to permit so much continued oppression in southern Africa. In this respect, the Neanderthal policies of the Hoover Institution scholars and those of similar programs at other universities pose no direct threat—the United States will never openly take up their proposals. But they do provide a strong pull to the right within the public debate in the U.S., even as they provide real, albeit short-term, goals for those who specialize in destabilization, *coups d'état*, and the like. To that extent they are indispensable to the likes of Robert Rotberg, and without them men like him would pose considerably less threat to the liberation movements.

DRESS REHEARSAL

by Miles Africanus

In Search of Enemies, by John Stockwell, Norton, 1978, 285 pp. \$12.95.

Secret Weapon in Africa, by Oleg Ignatyev, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977, 189 pp.

The Ford Administration's adventure in Angola presented a strange and contradictory spectacle. It was at once tough-minded and preposterous, aggressive and unsteady, banal and calamitous. It was the characteristic lashing out of a state and a ruling elite in growing disarray. At the same time, it was not simply a mistake. It was both logical and absurd, prefiguring things to come. Angola was a dress rehearsal for the coming war in southern Africa. In Angola the United States committed itself actively to preserving the status quo in that oppressed region.

The two books under review are very different. One, by the former chief of the CIA's Angola task force, is an account of a large-scale covert operation, the Angolan intervention of 1974-1976. The other, by the foreign affairs analyst of *Pravda*, is a narrative of the history and politics of an entire decade, focusing on the Agency's cardboard allies, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Taken together, the books by Stockwell and Ignatyev provide an absorbing picture of events in Angola, and of the secret war which Portugal and the United States began to wage against the future government of that country long before independence was achieved.

In Search of Enemies is an insider's story. Stockwell was the chief of the CIA's Angola task force, its executive officer. He saw everything of importance that there was to see. And he tells a great deal of what he saw, although by no means everything. His book demonstrates clearly once again—as if any demonstration were needed—that the CIA is a runaway, an intelligence agency whose politics lead inevitably to intervention. *In Search of Enemies* reveals the leadership of the CIA for what it is, a protected clique of ignorant and truculent men running a lawless machine which can lay waste a vulnerable nation in the space of a few months.

Stockwell's account is particularly valuable for two reasons. The first is that the official mythology of the Angolan war is a lie. The second is that he gives us an unusual and detailed account of the evolution of a large-scale covert action.

It is clear from Stockwell's account that there never was a "civil war" in Angola at all, that the CIA paid the FNLA and UNITA and armed them in order to mount a challenge to the MPLA. The Pike Report and Seymour Hersh's December 1975 articles in *The New York Times* suggested that US intervention began in January 1975. Stockwell reveals that the CIA began funding the operation in mid-1974 without the approval of the 40 Committee. As he puts it, the CIA spent "enough for word to get around that the CIA was dealing itself into the race." It was also that covert action which triggered the massive Soviet assistance to the People's Republic many months later. "Only in March 1975", he points out, "did the Soviet Union begin significant arms shipments to the MPLA." The CIA bureaucracy refused to see that its attempt to destroy the MPLA made a Soviet response almost inevitable.

Stockwell also gives us a close look at the CIA in action. Agee was able to describe the structure of the Agency and the operations carried out in particular Latin American stations. Stockwell, however, shows the whole Agency mobilizing to carry out a political and paramilitary coup in Angola. His is the first description of a major covert action program to come from an insider. He describes the dynamics of the Agency. He gives vivid and sometimes detailed accounts of reconnaissance missions in Angola, of daily routine at Langley, liaison with the Department of Defense, propaganda operations at the United Nations and in Kinshasa and Lusaka, Interdepartmental Group meetings, dealing within the CIA bureaucracy and the free-wheeling operations of station chiefs.

The information that Stockwell has set out in his book needs to be carefully sifted and analyzed. It is of great value to anyone who wants to understand how the CIA actually works. It complements the work of Marchetti and Marks, Agee, Wolf, Corson and others who have looked at the Agency critically from other perspectives. Stockwell has assembled a description which, although far from complete, tells us a great deal about the nature and organization of covert intervention.

Yet, while Stockwell's book is fascinating and important, it is also strangely disembodied. His description of events is so caught up with what was happening in the Agency that it too seems hermetically sealed from the outside world. Stockwell plunges into Angola like Mark Twain's innocent abroad, this time armed with a shotgun. Although he is ultimately revolted by what the Agency does in Angola, he does not seem to comprehend, in human terms, the remarkable drama which was unfolding there after 1974. His view of Jonas Savimbi, for instance, is sur-

prising. Stockwell evidently saw Savimbi as an engaging, intelligent leader of his people. His description of Roberto, with whom he was also in contact, is again personal rather than political. He appears not to have read anything, or thought it relevant to try to read anything, beneath their expressions in conversation.

The value of Ignatyev's book is that it is political. It reflects what any CIA case officer would call a shrewd understanding of what was going on in Angola in the years from 1966 to 1976. It is also grounded in a respect for and sympathy with the aims of national liberation. In a frankly impressionistic way, Ignatyev seeks to fill in the background which Stockwell leaves out, to describe the origins of the conflict which Stockwell sometimes appears to view as a vast, crashing football game. Ignatyev examines the long record of U.S. opposition to liberation in the former Portuguese colonies, the backgrounds of Roberto and Savimbi, the conspiracy between Mobutu and General Spínola to carve up Angola, the South African invasion of the country and the role of the CIA and its mercenary hirelings. In sum, he puts Stockwell in perspective.

What is especially interesting for an American audience is that Ignatyev reviews the tawdry political history of Roberto and Savimbi, the chosen "leaders" of Angola on whom the CIA lavished the taxpayers' dollars. He shows them to be nothing but opportunists and thieves driven by ambition and ruthlessness. He asserts that Roberto was recruited by the CIA at a very early stage, in 1959 when he was working in New York, and that he was sent back to Kinshasa to prepare himself for the time when the Portuguese would leave Angola and the U.S. would need a local manager. He suggests that Savimbi too was recruited early on, although he is not clear about who may have recruited him. (The present writer believes that Savimbi was in fact recruited by the British in the late 1960s. He was inexplicably established in Gower Street at the beginning of the decade, from which vantage point he made absurd and unconvincing Maoist noises in a little newsletter.)

Ignatyev makes a good case that neither Roberto nor Savimbi can claim to have led a liberation movement in Angola. Basing himself on public documents of the MPLA, records of the OAU and Portuguese press reports, he reveals that both were widely regarded with suspicion as early as the mid-1960s. Roberto is widely believed to have spent much of his time hunting out and engaging MPLA units. The record is not clear on the extent of his overt cooperation with the Portuguese military. In the case of Savimbi, however, there is fairly clear evidence. In 1974 the journal *Afrique-Asie* published several letters exchanged between Savimbi and various senior Portuguese officials and military men. These documents were evidently captured at the time of the fall of the Caetano regime. Ignatyev quotes from them at length, and the letters are devastating.

Secret Weapon in Africa contains a great deal of interesting material. One of the most intriguing passages, which spans nearly a chapter, is a slanting attack on the American Committee on Africa and its Executive Director. Ignatyev points out what no one denies, that in his early days Roberto knew the Executive Director and was assisted by

the ACOA, as were many African nationalists who went one way or another. Ignatyev suggests, however, that Roberto held meetings in ACOA offices with his CIA recruiters. Such things can happen, of course, without implicating anyone in the recruitment. But such a prominent, if veiled, attack by a senior Soviet journalist raises important questions. Why would such a person attack an organization like the American Committee on Africa? Is Ignatyev sending a political message? Is he suggesting that liberal organizations like ACOA are too tame to support the liberation struggle effectively now that the chips are down in Africa?*

For Western readers Ignatyev's book is stylistically difficult. It uses artifices of narrative that are unusual for us, such as the more or less accurate (probably) but imaginary account of conversation between two men which the author did not actually overhear. It also fails to document points which some Western journalists (not all) would feel obliged to footnote. It is also highly impressionistic, an odd mixture of first-hand narrative, analysis, lengthy quotes

Nuez, Granma, Havana



and some speculative reconstructions. But these are relatively trivial objections to a style which may be better understood in the original. The important point is that Ignatyev's book, despite its faults, is able to convey

*George Houser, Executive Director of ACOA, wrote Ignatyev on November 3, 1978, requesting an explanation of the reference to him in this section of the book. Ignatyev replied in a letter of December 17, 1978, forwarded for translation to the Soviet commercial legation in Washington, and transmitted to Hauser on March 5, 1979. In the letter, Ignatyev says, "There is nothing in the book, 'Secret Weapon in Africa,' that could give grounds for any conclusion that you have contacts with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, nor could I have inferred that, because none of the materials I had gathered for the book links your name directly with the CIA. Unfortunately, I cannot say the same for the ACOA. . . ." The letter concludes, "I want to stress once again that I have no reason at all to question the purity of your reputation. What is more, I am wholly convinced that most of your ACOA associates are sincere in their feelings towards the people of Africa, and are motivated in their activity by the wish to render what assistance they can to the African continent." [Editors' note.]

more truth than *The New York Times* conveyed in its entire coverage of Angola up to the the exposure of the CIA's role there.

These books remind us that we are living in a paradoxical, tumultuous and dangerous time. American power is being eroded and its rulers cannot really understand that fact. They wish to avoid "repeating the mistakes of the past", but they are driven to repeat them. There is no other way that the Robertos and the Savimbis can be placed in power and held there even for a short time. The Hudson Institute study of the Angola crisis, published in June of 1975, openly acknowledged that the MPLA would have won an election in Angola, just as SWAPO would win an election in Namibia if South Africa and its Western allies should be so rash as to permit one today.

In 1976 Brzezinski described an "America in a hostile world" and argued it could not survive if it did not learn to adapt to new realities. His search for the means of adapting, however, proved fruitless. The last sentence of his remarkable article is: "Above all, it is vital to remember that it is only America that has the power to shape a hostile world for itself." This means that America will use its power as the world seeks to free itself of the Pahlevis, the Litton Industries, the Suhartoos, the Bothas, the General


Dynamics, the Hassans and the Pfizer Chemicals.

At the same time the ruling elite will seek to preserve the illusion that it is doing nothing of the kind. In short, they will increasingly use clandestine power. The CIA will grow more powerful not less in the coming years. It was created to reconcile the imperial necessities of armed force and the sensibilities of a democratic consensus. And there will be greater need for it as the contradictions become sharper. The growth of the Agency's power, however, will also signify its decline. For by its very nature the CIA is an institution of transition. Its creation was a recognition that, even at the height of America's power, this democracy-and-empire could maintain its sway only by institutionalizing a capability for permanent warfare on its subjects.

The fact that the capability is being used more and more frequently and less and less effectively, when all is said and done, means that the problem, opposition, is becoming more than the institution can cope with. The experience of Angola therefore stands as a metaphor of a larger decline. The CIA launched a massive operation to smother a nation at its birth. It failed. And it failed precisely as its activities became known to the world and partly because of that. This is a dilemma, fortunately, from which the protected clique of ignorant and truculent gentlemen cannot escape.



NAMING NAMES: AFRICA



As part of this special supplement on Africa, we have restricted our research to the exposure of CIA personnel on that continent. However, we have devoted even greater energies to the work on this issue, and are pleased to present in this column fourteen Chiefs of Station, two Chiefs of Base, eight other senior case officers and five senior telecommunications officers—based, all told, in twenty-one African countries. We hope this research will help the just struggles of the African people.

Chiefs of Station

The Chief of Station in Cotonou, **Benin** is **Stanley F. Parkill**. From mid-1976 to mid-1977 he was at the Embassy in Vientiane, Laos. After approximately a year at Headquarters, he was transferred to Cotonou at least as of July 1978.

The Chief of Station in Gaborone, **Botswana** is **Robert A. Benedetti**, born December 24, 1942, in Massachusetts. Benedetti served as a projects officer at the State Department before being sent, in January 1974, to the Embassy in Kinshasa, Zaire, with the grade of R-6, and the cover position of political officer. He remained there till early 1977; no records have been found regarding his subsequent postings until September 1978, when, with the rank R-5, he was transferred to Gaborone as Chief of Station.

The Chief of Station in Yaounde, **Cameroon** is **James L. Corrigan**, who served from at least late 1974 till mid-1977 in the Office of the Special Assistant to the Ambassador in Paris, France, attaining the grade of R-4 during that period. He arrived in Yaounde no later than October 1977, and, we believe, in January 1979 was promoted to Chief of Station.

The Chief of Station in Bangui, **Central African Empire** appears to be **Jonathan F. Randall**. In late 1976, Randall was known to have been a telecommunications officer at the Kinshasa, Zaire Embassy. After advancing to grade R-4 in 1978, he appears, as of January 1979, at the Embassy in Bangui.

In N'djamena, **Chad** the Chief of Station is **James L. Atwater**, a CIA veteran. Atwater, born February 5, 1932 in North Carolina, served in the Army from 1953 to 1955, and again from 1957 to 1959. He was working within the Department of Commerce from 1965 to 1967, when he received his first diplomatic posting for the CIA as a political officer at the Embassy in Dakar, Senegal. In August 1970 he was transferred to the Embassy at Cotonou, Dahomey, still as a political officer, but advancing to grade R-4. From late 1973 to mid-1977 he appears to have been back at Headquarters, changing to rank RU-4. Then, at least as of September 1977, he was at the Embassy in N'djamena as Chief of Station. Atwater speaks French, and his wife, Collette Huc, is apparently of French extraction. Presumably, given the extent of French activities in Chad over the past several years, Atwater has been in active liaison with his SDECE counterparts.

A long-time CIA veteran, **Jeff Corydon, III**, is now Chief of Station in Djibouti, **Djibouti**. Born March 14, 1929, Corydon was a political analyst for the Department of the Army, a sure sign of CIA employment, from 1955 to 1957. In May 1957, he went to the Saigon, Vietnam Embassy, with the cover title of Assistant Attache and political officer, and the grade of S-9. He was then transferred to the Foreign Service Institute in Rabat, Morocco, after changing classification to R-7. While in Rabat he advanced to R-6, and in July 1963 returned to Headquarters. In August 1966, now R-5, he appeared in Tunis, Tunisia as an economic officer at the Embassy. Then, in June 1973, having reached R-4, he moved to the Embassy at Yaounde, Cameroon as a political-economic officer. He switched classifications again, to S-2, and was Chief of Station there. At least as of January 1976, he was back at Headquarters as an African specialist; in May 1978 he again switched classification, to R-4, and, in October of that year, was found in Djibouti with the cover title of economic-commercial officer.

Another Chief of Station with the Agency, almost from the beginning, is **John P. Horgan**, born February 9, 1928, ostensibly First Secretary at the Embassy in Accra, **Ghana**. After receiving his BA from Harvard in 1950, he joined the CIA, appearing in State Department records as a "political analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1950 to 1955. In August 1955, he moved to diplomatic cover as a language trainee at the Tokyo, Japan Embassy with a grade of R-5. There, he advanced to political officer in January 1957, and to Second Secretary in April 1957, all of these titles being, of course, simply cover. From mid-1959 to late 1960 he was back at Headquarters; we have been unable to ascertain his assignments from early 1961 till March 1962, when he reappeared at the Tokyo Embassy as an Attache and political officer, becoming again, in May 1962, Second Secretary. Between 1964 and late 1977, his whereabouts are again unascertainable. In September 1977, he resurfaced on the Accra Diplomatic List as First Secretary—unquestionably the Chief of Station. In June 1978 it is noted that he was advanced to grade R-3.

The Chief of Station in Bamako, **Mali** is **James W. Gamble**, born August 11, 1936. Gamble is first found in State Department records as an economic assistant in the Karachi, Pakistan Office in 1966, with the grade S-5. In early 1969, back at Headquarters, he advanced to S-4, and later that year switched classification to R-6. (As we have noted in earlier issues, and as John Marks wrote in "How to Spot a Spook," switching classifications from R grades to S grades and back is one of several tell-tale signs of CIA cover. The officers listed here amply confirm that thesis.) In January 1970, Gamble appears in Dakar, Senegal, and after some 18 months (1972-74) at Headquarters, went in April, 1974 to the Kinshasa, Zaire Embassy. In June 1977 he advanced to R-4, and as of August 1977 he is found at the Embassy in Bamako, apparently now Chief of Station.

The Chief of Station in Port Louis, **Mauritius** is **William J. Clair**, born September 12, 1935 in New York. Clair, too, was a Department of the Army "analyst" from 1965 to 1967, moving, in July of that year, to diplomatic cover as an economic officer at the Salisbury, Rhodesia Consulate

General, with the grade R-7. In 1969, he advanced to R-6, and moved to Asmara, Ethiopia as Vice-Consul and political officer. In 1970, he advanced to R-5; in August 1973 he was reassigned to the Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, still as a political officer, advancing to R-4 in 1974, and to R-3 in 1978. Then, at least as of December 1978, he appears at the Port Louis Embassy, as the Chief of Station for Mauritius.

Another very experienced veteran is the Chief of Station in Pretoria, **South Africa**, **Dorwin M. Wilson**. Wilson was born August 18, 1928 in Missouri. State Department records indicate vague private experience between 1952 and 1958, which might have included work for Agency proprietaries. He emerges with diplomatic cover in December 1958 as a political officer at the Nairobi, Kenya Embassy, grade R-7. The next year he became Vice-Consul, advanced, in 1962 to R-6; added the title of Attache in 1963; advanced to R-5 in 1964, and became Second Secretary that year as well. In September 1964, records show him back at CIA Headquarters, this time as a GS-14, and a foreign affairs officer. In May 1968, now R-4, he was sent to Lusaka, Zambia as Second Secretary and political officer, but in reality Chief of Station. In September 1971 he returned to Headquarters as an African specialist; in 1973 he advanced to R-3; and in August 1975 was transferred to Pretoria as Chief of Station for this most significant post. Information from a knowledgeable source in Pretoria indicates his presence there at least as late as September 1978, although we have been unable to verify if he is still holding down the Chief of Station position at this date. With more than twenty years' service in the Agency, and with the massive scandals breaking in South Africa, Wilson may well be one of the many reported veterans getting under the wire before the changes in the early retirement laws.



The CIA Chief of Station in Khartoum, **Sudan** is **Laurent Maubert St. Georges**, born August 24, 1928 in Pennsylvania. St. Georges, too, was with the Department of the Army from 1950 to 1951 and from 1955 to 1957. In between, State Department records indicate private "consultant" experience and a stint in the Marine Corps overseas. From 1962 to 1965, the records also indicate hazy

private experience as an "administrative assistant" and "consultant." It seems that St. Georges has considerable experience with proprietaries. His first diplomatic cover comes in June 1965 when he served as a public safety advisor for the Agency for International Development in Bangkok, Thailand, with the grade R-4. As has been well documented, this police/paramilitary program was a massive cover for some of the most vicious CIA operations. State Department records for 1970 to 1978 do not reveal his whereabouts. In October 1978 he reappears at the Embassy in Khartoum, surely at this point in his long career, the Chief of Station.

The Chief of Station in Dar-es-Salaam, **Tanzania** is **William L. Mosebey, Jr.**, born March 23, 1938 in Pennsylvania. Mosebey was a Department of the Army "training officer" from 1960 to 1965, and appeared under diplomatic cover as a political officer at the Khartoum, Sudan, Embassy in December 1965, with grade R-8. In 1966 he advanced to Consul, and in 1968 to R-7, after which he went back at Headquarters, and in March 1970 reappeared as Attache and economic-commercial officer in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, where he reached R-5. He returned to Langley in July 1972 as an African specialist, advanced to R-4 in 1973, and, in June 1973 was transferred to the Embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic as Second Secretary and political officer. At this stage in his career he was probably the Chief of Station. In 1975 he was back at Headquarters, and for the next three years no records of his whereabouts can be found. In June 1978 he turns up at the Dar-es-Salaam Embassy, once again serving as CIA Chief of Station.

The Chief of Station in Tunis, **Tunisia** is **James A. Natsios**, born October 3, 1928. Very few State Department records can be found documenting Natsios' evidently lengthy career in the Agency. In May 1969 he was listed as an economic-commercial officer at the Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, grade R-4. In July 1970, he was listed as a political officer. In August 1973 he returned to Headquarters, and no records can be found from then until mid-1976, when he appears as First Secretary in Tunis, apparently Chief of Station.

The new Chief of Station in Lusaka, **Zambia** is another veteran CIA man, **Robert H. Lupton**, born March 10, 1928 in New York. Lupton is shown in State Department records as having been a "research analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1952 to 1959. In April 1959 he appeared under diplomatic cover as a consular officer at the Singapore Embassy, grade R-6. He advanced to Vice-Consul later that year, and, in July 1961 returned to Headquarters. In March 1963 he came to Africa, as an Attache and political officer at the Freetown, Sierra Leone Embassy, R-5. Later he added the title of Second Secretary, and in October 1966 returned to Headquarters, where he switched classifications to S-3. In March 1969 he returned to Africa as a political officer at the Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Embassy, advancing to R-4. (R grades are the equivalent of S grades two figures higher.) In October 1973 he was again back at Headquarters, where he advanced to R-3 in June 1976. The next month he was transferred to Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, posted as First Secretary, but actually Chief of Station for Tanzania. In June 1978, he

was replaced as Chief of Station in Tanzania by **William L. Mosebey, Jr.**, described above, and in October 1978 he appears in Lusaka, Zambia, ostensibly as a commercial officer, but in fact, again, Chief of Station.

Chiefs of Base

The Chief of Base at Blantyre, **Malawi** is **Kenneth L. Hurley**. Hurley served from 1974 to 1978 at the Embassy in Lusaka, Zambia, at grade R-6, and with the cover titles of Second Secretary and economic-commercial officer. At least as of February 1978 he was transferred to the U.S. Consulate in Blantyre, as Second Secretary and Vice-Consul, advancing to R-5, and serving as Chief of Base.

The Chief of Base in Kaduna, **Nigeria** is **John F. McCarthy, III**, born September 5, 1941 in Washington, DC. McCarthy first appears as a State Department employee in August 1969, in Washington, with the grade S-4. He served there in the Foreign Service Institute and as an area specialist, being transferred in February 1970 to the Embassy in Saigon, Vietnam, with the cover title of political officer. In August 1972 he was transferred to the Embassy at Phnom Penh, Cambodia, this time as a consular officer. He advanced to R-5, and was back at the Foreign Service Institute for language training in April 1976. In July of that year he was transferred to the Consulate General at Osaka-Kobe, Japan, as Consul. At least as of August 1978, he has been at the Consulate in Kaduna, serving as Chief of Base.

Other Case Officers

A CIA case officer serving in Brazzaville, **Congo** is **David S. Rupp**. In June 1975, Rupp was a political officer at the Embassy in Bangui, Central African Republic, with the grade R-5. At least as of September 1978, he has been at the Brazzaville Embassy, with the cover position of consular officer.

In Addis Ababa, **Ethiopia** there is another case officer, **Robert E. McCall, III**. McCall has the grade R-7, and has been at the Embassy in Addis Ababa since at least May 1977.

A middle-level case officer serving at the Embassy in Nairobi, **Kenya** is **William Richard Stanley**. Stanley served from 1971 to 1973 with the well-known cover of Department of the Army "analyst" before appearing as Third Secretary and political officer at the Accra, Ghana Embassy, grade R-7. He was back at Headquarters as of November 1975, and, as of October 1977, appeared at the Nairobi Embassy, grade R-6, cover position Third Secretary and political officer.

Another case officer in Nairobi, **Kenya** is **Donn A. Weaver**. Weaver was at Headquarters, grade R-7, from April to about October 1976, when he appeared as Third Secretary at the Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania Embassy. As of August 1978, along with a number of CIA people in Tanzania, he was transferred, appearing in Nairobi as Third Secretary.

A case officer at the Embassy in Lagos, **Nigeria** is **Ernest B. Brant**. Brant, too, served as a "research analyst" for the Department of the Army, from 1972 to 1974. In February of that year he appeared as Third Secretary and political officer, grade R-7, at the Nairobi, Kenya Embassy. In April 1975 he was transferred to Pretoria, South Africa, as Third Secretary and economic-commercial officer. In August 1976 he was back at Headquarters, advanced to grade R-6 in February 1978, and as of July of that year was at the Embassy in Lagos.

At the Dakar, **Senegal** Embassy a young case officer is **Edward J. Carroll, III**, born November 24, 1947. Carroll served as an "area analyst" for the Department of the Army from 1969 to 1973. In July of that year he appeared with diplomatic cover as Third Secretary and political officer, grade R-8, at the Monrovia, Liberia Embassy. As of January 1976 he was back at Headquarters, and, at least as of September 1977, he appears at the Dakar Embassy.

A case officer in Lusaka, **Zambia** is **Norman H. Gardner, Jr.** Gardner was in the mid-1970s at the Nairobi, Kenya Embassy as Second Secretary, before appearing, at least as of October 1977, in Lusaka.

Another case officer in Lusaka, **Zambia** is **Frederick B. Lundahl**. Lundahl appears at least as of July 1976 in Lusaka, as Second Secretary and consular officer. It is not known definitely whether Lundahl is still in Lusaka.

Telecommunications Officers

A high-ranking telecommunications officer in Monrovia, **Liberia** is **Marvin H. Chindgren**. Chindgren, born June 1, 1931, has a long career as a CIA communications officer. He is listed as a communications technician with the Department of the Army from 1951 to 1967. In March 1967 he moved to diplomatic cover, appearing as a telecommunications specialist at the Tokyo, Japan Embassy, with the high grade of S-3. In July 1970 he was transferred to Vientiane, Laos, advancing, in 1972, to S-2. We have been unable to find records relating to him between late 1973 and mid-1975, when, in July, he reappeared as telecommunications officer at the Monrovia Embassy with the new classification and grade R-4. As of September 1978, he had advanced to R-3, and became, at that time, telecommunications chief for the CIA in Monrovia, the Agency's central telecommunications relay base for all of Africa.

Another senior telecommunications officer is **Richard B. George**, also in Monrovia, **Liberia**, a major CIA telecommunications station. Records list George, born August 24, 1932, as an electronic engineer for the Department of the Army from 1958 to 1965. In June 1965 he was transferred to the Embassy in Manila, Philippines, a major CIA telecommunications post for the Far East, where he advanced from grade S-4 to S-3. No records can be found relating to George between 1969 and late 1978; apparently he was under deeper cover. As of November 1978 he appears at the Monrovia Embassy, probably as deputy telecommunications chief under Chindgren.

Yet another senior telecommunications officer in Monrovia, **Liberia** is **Alvin R. Wichterman**, born October 10, 1926. Wichterman was serving in that capacity at the Embassy in Athens, Greece, in May 1970, grade S-4. In 1972 he advanced to S-3, and in October 1973 was back at Headquarters. No records have been found relating to him between early 1974 and mid-1978, when, in June of that year, he reappears at Headquarters, now R-5. Then, at least as of August 1978 he joined the large telecommunications section with the CIA Station in Monrovia.

A telecommunications officer for the CIA in Khartoum, **Sudan** is **Henry D. Hollaway**. Hollaway first appears in State Department records as a clerk at the Lima, Peru Embassy, grade S-4. In February 1975 he is shown as back at Headquarters, now R-5, and in April of that year he appears as a telecommunications officer at the Kathmandu, Nepal Embassy. As of March 1978 he is found at the Khartoum Embassy.

A senior telecommunications officer in Lusaka, **Zambia** is **John F. Behrens**. Behrens was a radio technician with the Department of the Army from 1954 to 1957. In September 1957 he appeared at the Manila, Philippines Embassy as a communications assistant, grade S-11. In March 1960 he was transferred to the Consulate General in Damascus, United Arab Republic, now S-10. From December 1962 to May 1966 he was back with the Department of the Army, and in June 1966 reappeared under diplomatic cover at the New Delhi, India Embassy, now advanced to S-6. From 1968 to 1971 he was again under Department of the Army cover, until November 1971, when he reappeared at the Lagos, Nigeria Embassy. In November 1974 he was back at Headquarters, and we have been unable to find records of his whereabouts between April 1975 and June 1978. In July 1978 he reemerges under diplomatic cover, at the Lusaka Embassy, where he is probably telecommunications chief.

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NEWS NOTES

CIA Learning About Human Rights

All our readers who monitor the human rights situation closely in various countries of the world which, over the years and at present, are recipients of American military and police paraphernalia, torture equipment, and advice, can take heart in knowing that the CIA is jumping on the human rights bandwagon. Ms. Michele Bova, a State Department human rights officer for economic and development affairs, spoke on January 30 to an advanced intelligence seminar at the CIA. People around the world may rest comfortably in the knowledge that the local CIA operations officers will be looking out for their human rights while training, subsidizing and underwriting the secret police and murder squads they face day in and day out.

Turner In Trouble?

Defense Secretary Harold Brown's announcement on January 12 that President Carter had nominated CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner for the hallowed grade of Admiral on the retired list more than six years before the mandatory retirement age of 62, may have been just a prelude of what is to come. Since the day the Admiral moved into Langley in March 1977, there have been constant hints in the media and from Agency insiders that the Admiral was hoping one day to be named to the highest military post in the land—Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now the Admiral may be receiving his own pink slip from the White House. The *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 1979), hardly a voice of anti-government views, let it be known that the White House has initiated a "full FBI field investigation" of John D. deButts, Chairman of American Telephone and Telegraph. Department of Energy chief and former CIA Director, James Schlesinger, has long wanted to return to the national security mainstream, and some Washingtonians note the President's dissatisfaction with the CIA's performance in Iran, Afghanistan, Guyana and southern Africa. It could be early retirement for the Admiral.

Intelligence Budgets and Other Well-Kept Secrets

"New authority given the Director of Central Intelligence has created a massive monolith of power." No, that is not a quote from the *CovertAction Information Bulletin*, but from *Electronic Warfare/Defense Electronics*, the November 1978 issue. With lucid and informative color diagrams of the U.S. intelligence apparatus, with brief analyses of the priorities of its various components, and with assessments of the numbers of employees and estimated annual budgets of the various civilian and military intelligence agencies, the article, "Changing Intelligence Priorities," goes at least part of the way to making the case set forth in the quotation above.

While the employees and budget chart, which we reprint here, offers considerable insight on the relative size and

| US Intelligence Community | | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|-------------------------|
| Organization | Employees | Est. Annual Budget (\$) |
| Central Intelligence Agency | 16,500 | 1 billion |
| National Security Agency* | 20,000 | 3 billion |
| Defense Intelligence Agency* | 5,500 | 250 million |
| Army Intelligence* | 37,500 | 900 million |
| Naval Intelligence* | 17,000 | 1.2 billion |
| Air Force Intelligence** | 56,000 | 6.5 billion |
| State Department INR | 500 | 20 million |
| FBI (Internal Security Div.) | 800 | 60 million |
| AEC (Division of Intelligence) | 300 | 25 million |
| Treasury Department | 400 | 15 million |
| Totals | 154,500 | 12.9 billion |


*Department of Defense agencies
**Includes National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

budget of the different agencies, there are what seems to us to be two areas where it may be wrong about the CIA. The magazine's estimates for the total number of CIA employees and its budget are indeed substantial (16,500 and \$1 billion). However, our research indicates that these figures should probably read about 30,000 and \$1.5 billion. In any event, the actual figures are the most tightly held secrets in Washington. More to the point, the article's description of the Agency's Directorate of Operations as simply one of the CIA's six directorates, without discussing the dominant position within the CIA's own priorities of the Operations branch, is a major deficiency of the article. Even so, it is well worth reading.

CIA Firearms Authority: What Does It Mean?

H.R. 2827, introduced in the House of Representatives on March 13, 1979, purports to be the fiscal 1980 appropriations bill for the CIA, but it appears to be more than that. A knowledgeable source on Capitol Hill has indicated to *CovertAction* that some provisions are quite a departure from existing authority. Most notable is Title IV, Central Intelligence Agency Firearms Authority. This allows the Director to authorize CIA personnel to carry firearms within the United States, provided that it is in the discharge of official duties limited to the "protection of: (i) information concerning intelligence sources or methods . . . ; (ii) facilities . . . owned or utilized by the Agency; (iii) the Director and the Deputy Director, and other Agency personnel as may be designated . . . ; and (iv) defectors and foreign persons visiting the United States under Agency auspices . . ." The latter function has always been exclusively the province of the Secret Service or the FBI, and in any event, the provisions as a whole appear to authorize CIA gunslinging throughout the U.S. in connection with virtually all their activity. After all, what is not "information concerning intelligence sources or methods?"

The new material foreshadows more, not less, domestic CIA activity.



DIRTY WORK

The CIA In Western Europe

Edited by Philip Agee and
Louis Wolf

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Publications of Interest

Cervenka, Zdenek, and Barbara Rogers, *The Nuclear Axis: Secret Collaboration Between West Germany and South Africa*, 464 pp., 7.95 pounds sterling from Julian Friedman Books, Ltd., 4 Perrins Lane, London NW3, England (1978); also available from New York Times Books, New York. (Documented from a huge number of classified files which disappeared from the South African Embassy in Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, and were later reprinted by the African National Congress of South Africa and a progressive West German publication, *3. Welt Magazine*; this chilling yet fascinating book examines the secret nuclear collaboration between West Germany and South Africa which has led to the transfer of nuclear know-how to the racist regime, and to its ultimate goal—the bomb.)

Western Massachusetts Association of Concerned African Scholars, *U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa*, 276 pp., \$5.00, from South End Press, Box 68, Astor Station, Boston, MA 02123 (1978). (An excellent comprehensive effort of a collective group of scholars to examine the crisis in Southern Africa, western strategy, covert operations, and the U.S. contribution to South Africa's military build-up.)

Gervasi, Sean, *The United States and the Arms Embargo Against South Africa: Evidence, Denial and Refutation*, 49 pp., Southern Africa Pamphlets, No. 2 (1978), by the Foundation of the State University of New York at

Binghamton. (Contains Gervasi's testimony before the House Subcommittee on Africa, detailing arms inventories of South Africa; the denial of William H. Lewis, Director of the Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; and finally Gervasi's refutation with further evidence of U.S. arms transfers to South Africa in violation of the United Nations embargo.)

The Journal of the Institute of Race Relations and the Transnational Institute, *Race and Class*, quarterly, \$10.00 or 5.50 pounds sterling per year, from Race and Class, 247-9 Pentonville Road, London N1, England. (A journal focusing on Third World problems and realities, including articles by many African experts.)

Lemarchand, Rene, Editor, *American Policy in Southern Africa: The Stakes and the Stance*, 450 pp., \$10.50, from University Press of America, 4710 Auth Place, Washington, DC 20023 (1978). (A detailed examination of American policy on southern Africa, including two worthwhile chapters on CIA covert action in Africa.)

Munroe, Trevor, *The Workers Party: What It Is, Why It Is Necessary*, published by WLL, 2B Marescaux Rd., Kingston, Jamaica, December 1978. (A booklet describing the transformation of the Workers Liberation League to the Workers Party of Jamaica, explaining its differences with the traditional parties in that country.)

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